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Abstract: It is said that ‘generals fight the last war’.  Regulators can do the same.  The question 
is whether in the plethora of reforms that are being developed, the financial regulators are 
building the regulatory equivalent of the Maginot Line or whether they are devising strategies 
that will enable them to counter, or at the very least anticipate, the next crisis.  The paper 
focuses on regulators’ capacities for anticipation rather than resilience per se. It argues that for 
these capacities to be developed, the current mechanisms by which the financial regulators 
learn of their own and each others’ performance need to be quite fundamentally reoriented and 
regulators need to build in stronger mechanisms for cognitive challenge.  The paper analyses 
the cognitive shifts prompted by the crisis, and associated policy developments.  It then 
considers the changes in organisational structures of financial regulation at the global and EU 
levels, linking those to the cognitive shifts identified, and focusing on current mechanisms of 
observation, communication, enforcement and coordination.  In particular it examines how 
key actors are positioning themselves within the regulatory system as a whole and the modes of 
coordination they are developing.  It then considers how the system’s existing and potential 
capacities for reflexive learning and dynamic responsiveness can be strengthened.  It focuses 
on two elements of that challenge: building capacity through enhancing information and 
knowledge, both about what is happening outside the system in the markets and the 
performance of the regulatory system itself, and developing mechanisms of challenge.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
It is said that ‘generals fight the last war’.  Regulators can do the same.  In the 
wake of the crisis, regulators and politicians are currently fighting on a number of 
battlefronts.  New policies are rapidly proliferating from the international 
committees of regulators, from international organisations such as the OECD and 
IMF, from national governments, and from the EU. New provisions are being 
brought in, regulatory structures are being reconfigured, and new regulators are 
being created.   
The question is whether the financial regulators are building the regulatory 
equivalent of the Maginot Line, or whether they are devising strategies that will 
enable them to counter, or at the very least anticipate, the next crisis.  Given that 
regulators usually lack the powers of psychics or soothsayers, the likelihood is that 
the measures being put in place now will not prevent another crisis; they may not 
even prevent the same type of crisis recurring, but that is a separate argument.  We 
know there will be another crisis, but do not know where it will come from.  The 
question is whether the regulatory structures being created at the global and EU 
level are building in sufficient capacity for regulators and others to anticipate 
future crises, and sufficient resilience to withstand them when anticipation fails.   
There is no doubt that policymakers recognise these demands.  In particular, 
the need to build a greater capacity for surveillance has been recognised in reforms 
to the organisational structure of financial regulation at the global, EU, and in 
some cases national level.  However, regulators failed not just because they did not 
look hard enough at what was happening in the markets.  It was also that their 
cognitive understandings of the way markets operated, and the way markets and 
regulation interacted, were flawed.  Conventional wisdom has been overthrown by 
the power of events, prompting a paradigm shift in some aspects of financial 
regulatory policy.  However, just what paradigm should replace the old is still 
unclear, although the contours of the new conventional wisdom are becoming 
clearer.  Part of the challenge for regulators going forward is whether they can put 
in place ways to challenge conventional wisdoms, including their own, before 
another crisis does it for them. 
The paper analyses the impact that the cognitive shifts prompted by the crisis 
are having on the organisation of global and EU financial regulation, and on the 
mechanisms which currently exist or are being developed to enable regulators to 
observe and evaluate both the markets and the regulatory regime itself and to 
facilitate dynamic responsiveness to changes in both.  The paper focuses on 
regulators’ capacities for anticipation rather than resilience per se, and argues that 
for these capacities to be developed the current mechanisms by which the 
financial regulators learn of their own and each others’ performance need to be 
quite fundamentally reoriented.  In addition, regulators need to build in 
mechanisms for cognitive challenge.  As senior economists advised the Queen, the 
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crisis was caused by a ‘collective failure of imagination’.1  The crisis created a series 
of cognitive as well as financial shocks.  But despite the various changes being 
introduced, it is not clear that some of the main lessons have really been learnt.  
There is some recognition by regulators of the complexity, fragmentation, 
interdependencies, and dynamic adaptability of the system they are attempting to 
regulate.  However, rather than move to build flexibility and scope for variety and 
learning into the regime, the policy dynamic at the moment is to retreat into 
hierarchical regulation that seeks to control both markets and other regulatory 
actors through detailed rules, and within the EU, harmonised control.  The 
dynamics driving these policy processes are understandable, but there is a 
significant risk of introducing new rigidities into the system.  Instead, reflexive 
learning and dynamic responsiveness to the regime’s own performance need to 
become the central principles on which the global and EU regulatory regimes 
operate. 
The paper argues that in order to develop structures and strategies for 
dynamic responsiveness we need first to understand the changes in the 
organisational structures of global and EU financial regulation and the cognitive 
shifts which underlie them.  The crisis has prompted significant re-evaluation of 
the previous assumptions and understandings of how the financial markets 
operate and of the nature of risks in the market.  However, it has also prompted 
an awareness of how the regulatory regime itself performs: the feedback loops and 
dependencies regulation can create and the inter-dependencies that exist between 
regulators and firms within and between countries.  With respect to financial 
markets, the assumption that the ‘sum of the whole is greater than its parts’ has 
been replaced by the recognition that ‘the whole is only as strong as its weakest 
link’.2  It is increasingly recognised in some quarters that this aphorism applies 
equally to the regulatory system as it does to the markets.  No longer is it seen as 
sufficient to focus on the monitoring and supervision either of individual 
institutions or of individual countries; what is important is the operation of the 
system as a whole.  
Linked to these cognitive changes is a normative reassessment of what 
regulation should be trying to achieve.  Although there is broad consensus on the 
normative goals of financial regulation, viz financial stability, investor protection, 
and prevention of market abuse, there is far less agreement as to just what these 
mean in different instances,3 and even less as to what measures should be taken to 
                                                     
1 On a visit to the LSE in November 2008, the Queen asked, ‘Why did no one see this coming?’  The 
British Academy forum of economists convened to answer the Queen’s question wrote to her concluding 
that ‘the failure to foresee the timing, extent and severity of the crisis and to head it off, while it had many 
causes, was principally a failure of the collective imagination of many bright people, both in this country 
and internationally, to understand the risks to the system as a whole’.  Letter dated 22nd July 2009.  See 
also FSA, The Turner Review: a Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis (London: FSA, 2009). 
2 IMF, The Fund’s Mandate – An Overview (January 2010), 12. 
3 On the issues in defining and identifying financial stability see eg A. Crockett, ‘The Theory and Practice 
of Financial Stability’ (1996) 144(4) De Economist 531; C. Goodhart and D. Tsomocos, ‘Analysis of 
Financial Stability’ (Special Paper 173, Financial Markets Group, London School of Economics, 2007); O. 
Aspachs, C. Goodhart, M. Segoviano, D. Tsomocos, and L. Zicchino, ‘Searching for a Metric for 
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attain them.  There are also conflicting policy dynamics, with centrifugal pressures 
to move regulation to the international level being countered by centripetal 
pressures for unilateralism either by individual countries or the EU.   
The pace of policy development is so great and the proliferation of proposals 
currently emanating across the regime so numerous that there are significant risks 
of creating further tensions and internal conflicts if their development is 
insufficiently coordinated.4  Coordination is not simply a matter of technical 
agreement, however; the tensions and conflicts are often deeply rooted, raising 
significant issues of regime management across all the regime’s dimensions and 
enhancing the need to develop capacities for reflexive observation and dynamic 
adaptation.   
This article analyses the current policy developments in financial regulation at 
the global and EU level, linking these to cognitive and normative changes.  It 
groups these developments into four main areas: surveillance, resilience, stability, 
and regime management.  It then considers the developments in the institutional 
structures at the international level, focusing on the re-formulated Financial 
Stability Board (FSB), the IMF, the EU multi-lateral arrangements for 
coordination through colleges of supervisors.  In both it considers current 
mechanisms of observation, communication, and enforcement mechanisms within 
different parts of the regulatory regime. The discussion then turns to examine in 
more depth the difficult issues of regime management, coordination and learning.  
The article analyses the different strategies being used at the international and EU 
level.  In particular it focuses on the significance of the cognitive frameworks of 
different actors in shaping responses and analyses how key actors are positioning 
themselves within the regulatory system as a whole and the modes of coordination 
they are developing.  It then considers how the system’s existing and potential 
capacities for reflexive learning and dynamic responsiveness can be strengthened.  
It focuses on two elements of that challenge: building capacity through enhancing 
information and knowledge, both about what is happening outside the system in 
the markets and the performance of the regulatory system itself, and developing 
mechanisms of challenge.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
Financial Stability’ (Special Paper 167, Financial Markets Group, London School of Economics, 2006); H. 
Davies and D. Green, Banking on the Future: The Rise and Fall of Central Banking (Princeton University Press, 
2010), 54-59. 
4 For example the potential for statutory schemes for bank resolution that impose moratoria on payments 
can conflict with the status of private netting agreements in insolvency law: see P. Paech, ‘Systemic Risk, 
Regulatory Powers and Insolvency Law: The Need for an International Instrument on the Private Law 
Framework for Netting’ (Working Paper Series no. 116, Institute for Law and Finance, Goethe 
Universitat, 2010). 
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FINANCIAL REGULATION – A POLYCENTRIC REGIME 
 
It is fashionable now in financial regulation circles to emphasise the complexity 
and adaptability of the financial system and the unpredictability of regulation.5  
However, more generic analyses of regulation and governance have been 
emphasising these themes for some time.6  Regulatory systems and the systems 
they attempt to regulate are often complex and dynamic, with significant 
interdependencies existing within and between them.7   Power and knowledge are 
fragmented between different actors, with significant implications for the 
construction and operation of regulatory regimes.  The performance of ‘regulation’ 
is also often disaggregated into a number of different functions that are dispersed 
between a number of actors at the international, regional, national, and sub-
national level who co-exist in a range of different relationships.  Complex 
interactions and interdependencies exist between social actors, and between social 
actors and government in the process of regulation, some of which regulation 
itself creates.8  Those being regulated have significant operational autonomy, and 
their response to regulation is often unpredictable.  Those attempting to regulate 
others thus face significant challenges.  Some of these are unique to the particular 
task or task environment – such as managing particular risks or structuring certain 
markets; others, such attempting to manage behaviour, are generic across 
regulatory regimes.   
Regulation thus is a messy, complex, and largely imperfect process.  In order 
to have some hope of regulating effectively regulators, or more accurately the 
system of regulators as a whole, need some capacity to regulate, and to regulate 
dynamically.  Regulatory capacity, it is suggested, is a composite of resources, 
attitudes and interests.9  Resources comprise: information, knowledge and 
expertise, financial resources, organisational capacity, power or strategic position, 
and authority and legitimacy.  However, resources are only one aspect of capacity; 
what is also important is an understanding of motivations of those in possession 
of resources, their ‘motivational postures’ or ‘attitudinal settings’, which may be 
                                                     
5 eg S. Schwarcz, ‘Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets’ (2009-10) 8(2) Washington University L Rev, 
forthcoming. 
6 eg G. Teubner, ‘After Legal Instrumentalism: Strategic Models of Post-Regulatory Law’ in G. Teubner 
(ed), Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State (Berlin, 1986); N. Rose and P. Miller, ‘Political Power Beyond the 
State: Problematics of Government’ (1992) 43(2) British Journal of Sociology 173; J. Kooiman (ed), Modern 
Governance: New Government-Society Interactions (London, 1993). 
7 See J. Black, ‘Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self Regulation in a 
“Post-Regulatory” World’ (2001) 54 Current Legal Problems 103; J. Black, ‘Constructing and Contesting 
Legitimacy in Polycentric Regulatory Regimes’ (2008) Regulation and Governance 1. 
8 See eg J. Kooiman, ‘Findings, Speculations and Recommendations’ in J. Kooiman, n 6 above 253; N. 
Rose, Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (Cambridge: CUP, 1999); L. Hancher and M. Moran, 
‘Organizing Regulatory Space’ in L. Hancher and M. Moran (eds), Capitalism, Culture and Economic 
Regulation (Oxford: OUP, 1989). 
9 J. Black, ‘Enrolling Actors in Regulatory Processes: Examples from UK Financial Services Regulation’ 
(2003) Public Law 62. 
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based in norms of self interest, appropriateness, or both.10  Moreover, where 
either or both regulatory actors and capacities are dispersed, then there needs to 
be some way in which they are coordinated to achieve the particular outcome or 
outcomes sought, either by the whole or each of its participants.  
The challenges facing the global financial regulatory regime are thus not 
unique in all respects, but they are severe.11  The regime comprises non-state and 
state actors operating at the global level, at the regional level, at the national level, 
and within individual firms. The focus here is not on the relationship between 
regulators (state or non-state) and firms. 12  Rather it focuses on the interactions 
between regulators themselves within the regime.13   
At the global level, the regime is characterised by a multiple of committees 
and organisations, each with different memberships, legal bases, mandates, and 
powers.14  There are individual committees of securities regulators (International 
Organisation of Securities Commissioners, IOSCO), central bankers from the G8 
countries (now the G20) (Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), a 
committee of the Basle Institute of Settlements (BIS), and insurance regulators 
(International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS).  These coordinate in 
the development of principles for financial conglomerates in the Joint Forum.  In 
addition, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), a group of 
professional experts, sets accounting rules, the International Financial Reporting 
Standards, which are used by most major economies apart from the US.  The 
international financial institutions (IFIs), the World Bank, and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) have to date played only a peripheral role in global financial 
regulation, notwithstanding their role in the current bail out of Ireland, and in 
effect its banks. They have not participated in the development of principles or 
standards, but they have played a role in monitoring the implementation of some 
of those principles within individual countries as part of their broader FSAP 
activities (Financial Services Assessment Process).  In 1999, following the rescue 
of a hedge fund, Long Term Capital Management, the Financial Stability Forum 
(FSF) was created to coordinate these different bodies and bring in others, notably 
the OECD and the IFIs, and to bring G7 finance ministers closer to the standard-
                                                     
10 J. March and J. Olsen, ‘The New Institutionalism: Organisational Factors in Political Life’ (1984) 78 
American Political Science Review 734; V. Braithwaite, K. Murphy, and M. Reinhart, ‘Taxation Threat, 
Motivational Postures, and Responsive Regulation’ (2007) 29(1) Law & Policy 137. 
11 The term ‘regime’ here is used to refer to a set of interrelated units that are engaged in joint problem 
solving to address a particular goal; its boundaries are defined by the definition of the problem being 
addressed, and it has some continuity over time: C. Hood, H. Rothstein, and R. Baldwin, The Government of 
Risk (Oxford: OUP, 2001), 9-17.  
12 Firms themselves are regulatory actors in that they have internal systems of regulation (eg compliance, 
risk management, internal audit), though on significantly different scales depending on their size, and in 
that they are actors whose behaviour contributes to the overall performance of the regulatory regime. 
13 By regulators I am referring to those state or non-state actors who have been given a mandate to 
regulate the behaviour of others (though not necessarily by all those they purport to regulate), ie engage 
in organised attempts to influence their behaviour. 
14 See H. Davies and D. Green, Global Financial Regulation: The Essential Guide (London: Polity Press, 2008). 
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setting processes of the different regulatory committees.15  As a consequence of 
the crisis the membership of the FSF and BCBS was broadened to comprise the 
G20 countries, and the FSF reconstituted as the Financial Stability Board (FSB).  
With the exception of the IFIs all the organisations operate on the basis of soft 
law.   
At the European level, in addition to the usual lawmaking institutions, there 
are separate committees of finance ministers that advise the Commission on 
securities, banking, and insurance legislation.  Of more importance have been the 
‘level 3’ committees of regulators in each of these areas: the Committee of 
European Securities Regulators (CESR), the Committee of European Insurance 
and Occupational Pension Supervisors (CEIOPS), and the Committee of 
European Banking Supervisors (CEBS).  As their name suggests, these are 
committees of regulators established formally as part of the reforms to the 
structure of EU lawmaking in the area of financial regulation.16  Their role to date 
has been to advise and facilitate consultations on draft legislative proposals and to 
develop technical guidance on the implementation of legislative provisions.  The 
European Central Bank has to date played almost no role in financial regulation.  
As discussed below, this structure is about to be radically altered with the 
introduction of the European System of Financial Supervision. 
 
 
 
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICY BATTLEFRONTS 
 
The financial crisis is prompting significant changes in the organisational 
structures of financial regulation at the global and EU levels.  Underlying these 
changes is a complex set of policy and institutional dynamics.  The political talk is 
of harmonisation, coordination, and cooperation, but on key issues we see 
Balkanisation as countries go it alone.17  Centrifugal pressures that push regulation 
towards certain central points are being counteracted by significant centripetal 
pressures which are pushing it back towards national governments.   So on the 
one hand, although normative consensus may be hard to achieve, regulators and 
governments recognise that international harmonisation can be in their own 
interests for a number of reasons.  The markets are peripatetic and can easily 
engage in regulatory arbitrage.  Countries that introduce tougher regulation can 
                                                     
15 According to Davies and Green, the ECB ‘turned up at the first meeting uninvited and has never been 
shown the door’, ibid, 114.  The European Commission, on the other hand, was invited but refused to 
attend: ibid.  Given the Commission’s insistence after the crisis that it be a member of the FSB, its 
priorities had clearly changed. 
16 ‘Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Market’ 
(February 2001), at  
www.europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/securities/docs/lamfalussey/wisemen/final-report-wise-
men_en.pdf. 
17 For example the deep disputes over whether banks should be broken up. 
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suffer ‘first mover disadvantage’ as financial business moves elsewhere.  It is 
therefore preferable to increase regulatory requirements on a harmonised basis.   
However, it is not just the threat of loss of business that is driving the move 
to international harmonisation.  The crisis demonstrated that the globalised 
markets create significant interdependencies between regulators for each to be able 
to achieve its objectives, both in normal times and in times of crisis.  In particular, 
within the EU the principle of home country control, combined with the global 
nature of financial markets, makes one country significantly dependent on the 
quality of regulation in another.  Through the passporting regime, one country’s 
weak regulation can be brought into another country through a cross-border 
bank.18  At the same time there is less willingness to trust other national 
governments to deliver regulatory regimes that are robust enough to be relied 
upon.  Harmonisation, supported by mechanisms of enforcement, can increase 
control by a group of countries over another’s regulatory regime and thus reduce 
the vulnerabilities that such interdependencies create.   
Further, as the handling of the crisis demonstrated, unilateral actions by one 
country can have negative spillover effects on others.  For example, when Ireland 
introduced a full deposit guarantee for all its banks in September 2008 there was 
an immediate flight of capital from the UK to Ireland, prompting the UK and 
then the EU to raise deposit guarantee limits within a matter of days.  Again, 
coordinated action is sought to prevent such negative spillover effects recurring.  
These ‘bottom up’ pressures accord with attempts from international bodies and 
the EU authorities to enhance the control that they exert over the financial 
regulatory regime, or at least parts of it.  All of these factors exert centrifugal 
pressures, pushing regulation to the international level.    
On the other hand, national governments have become acutely aware of the 
potential cost that the financial system can impose on their own taxpayers.  As has 
been acutely observed, banks are global in life but national in death.19  There are 
clear signs that this ‘mortality mismatch’, as I call it, is exerting a fundamental 
influence on policymaking.  There is a recognition that international 
harmonisation or at least co-ordination is necessary to manage financial 
institutions in life (for example through colleges of supervisors) and when they are 
critically ill (through cross-border crisis management procedures).  However, the 
process of managing their death (powers and procedures for the resolution of 
failing banks) and dealing with its consequences (funding bail-outs and / or 
deposit guarantees) remains national, at least for the moment.  In 2007-2009, 
governments in the US, the UK, and the rest of the EU were forced to inject USD 
4.89 trillion directly into banks and other financial institutions, equivalent to six 
                                                     
18 The UK Treasury Select Committee has recommended the abandonment of the passporting regime for 
banks, which would be a significant move contrary to one of the EU’s central principles of freedom of 
movement: Treasury Select Committee, Banking Crisis: Regulation and Supervision (Fourteenth Report of 
Session 2008–2009, HC 767, London: HMSO, 2009). 
19 M. King, evidence to UK Treasury Select Committee, ibid, response to Q146. 
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per cent GDP in each country / region and to issue guarantees on bank borrowing 
and bank assets that, if called upon, would equate to USD14 trillion gross: the 
equivalent of 50 per cent of the GDP in each country / region.20  Governments 
are understandably concerned to ensure that they will not have to do this again 
and are putting in measures to prevent such calls on their budget deficits, often 
unilaterally.  Whilst it remains national governments and their taxpayers that have 
to pick up the bill for financial failure, those governments will be concerned to 
protect their fiscal position and to retain the right and ability to do so.    
Banks’ ‘mortality mismatch’ and national governments’ fiscal protectionism 
thus create a fundamental source of tension between the centrifugal forces which 
push agenda-setting to the international level, and centripetal forces which push it 
out to national governments as countries ‘go it alone’.  Part of the reason for the 
Commission’s proposal for an EU-wide resolution fund for banks (as distinct 
from that for sovereign debt), is to reduce, or preferably eliminate, this tension.  
The requirement for pre-funding by the banks is intended to reduce the burden on 
taxpayers from bank failures.  However, one of the reasons for its pan-European 
nature is to minimise the incentive effects for EU member states to act unilaterally 
in a crisis to protect their own taxpayers on the insolvency of a cross-border 
bank.21  
The organisational restructuring, it is suggested, is integrally linked both to 
these policy dynamics and to cognitive shifts in the understanding of the nature of 
the markets, the nature of the problems, and the solutions that need to be 
imposed.  It is important to understand these developments, as they both 
demonstrate the need for reflexive learning and dynamic adaptability and indicate 
some of the impediments to achieving those aims. The plethora of current policy 
initiatives is potentially overwhelming, but in an attempt to impose at least 
analytical coherence on them they are divided here into four interlinked groups: 
surveillance, resilience, stability, and regime management.   
 
SURVEILLANCE 
 
Getting information, and just as importantly, making sense of it, is a critical 
element of any regulatory system and has been shown to be deeply lacking in 
financial regulation.  As the FSB/IMF report on information gaps observed, 
‘[T]he recent crisis has reaffirmed an old lesson — good data and good analysis 
are the lifeblood of effective surveillance and policy responses at both the national 
and international levels.’22  Successive inquiries into the crisis have come up with 
the same conclusion, that regulators need far better information than they have 
                                                     
20 Bank of England, Financial Stability Reports (October 2008) and (June 2009). 
21 European Commission, ‘Communication to the European Parliament, Council, European Economic 
and Social Committee and the European Central Bank, Bank Resolution Fund’, COM 2010 254 FINAL 
(26 May 2010). 
22 FSB and IMF, The Financial Crisis and Information Gaps – Report to the G20 Finance Ministers and Central 
Bank Governors (November 2009), 4. 
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had before on the both on individual financial institutions and on the build-up of 
risk within the system.23  With respect to institutions they need to know their 
liabilities, their consolidated position, and the nature of their maturity mismatch.  
With respect to the system, they are seeking to understand the build-up of risk 
within the system, the nature of the inter-linkages between participants in the 
markets and between different types of risk, and the nature of maturity 
mismatches that exist on banks’ balance sheets and within and between currencies.  
In particular, the challenge is to understand the interrelationship between macro-
economic developments at the global and national level, their relationship with 
movements in the financial markets, and their impacts on the stability of individual 
financial institutions, and in turn of those institutions on financial stability – the 
‘macro-micro’ link.24   
The crisis showed that these links had been either ill-understood or 
significantly underemphasised.  For example, the links between aggregate leverage, 
valuation, and liquidity, particularly in a mark-to-market environment created by 
accounting rules and margin requirements, had simply not been recognised prior 
to the crisis. 25    
The crisis also revealed significant blind spots in the regulator’s vision.  There 
was very little data on inter-institutional exposures, including intra-group 
exposures, and on cross-border exposures.26  Some countries had only patchy 
information on their payment and settlement systems.27  Particular activities of 
some financial institutions were firmly in the spotlight, but others operated very 
much beyond the regulators’ gaze.  The ‘shadow banking system’ should be more 
accurately described as the ‘invisible banking system’.  ‘Over the counter’ dealings 
in derivatives equate to ‘under the radar’ dealings, so little is known by regulators 
about the details of these deals or of the inter-linkages and risk concentrations that 
are thereby created.    
Visibility is now sought over all activities of all participants, notably hedge 
funds, OTC derivative dealings, and intra-group exposures, in a relentless search 
for ‘synoptic legibility’.28   However, whilst improved legibility is necessary, what is 
also important is the development of a cognitive framework in which to make 
sense of the information collected and convert it from data to knowledge.29  Here 
the central challenge at the moment is to understand the exact nature of the links 
between macro-prudential developments and the adjustments that need to be 
                                                     
23 eg FSF, Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience (April 2008);  
IMF, n 2 above; IOSCO, Report on the Subprime Crisis - Final Report, Report of the Technical Committee of 
IOSCO (IOSCO, 2009). 
24 eg FSB and IMF, n 22 above; H. Hannoun, ‘Information Gaps – What has the Crisis Taught Us?’ 
(Speech delivered 20 April 2010). 
25 Joint FSF-CGFS Working Group, The Role of Valuation and Leverage in Procylclicality (March 2009), 2. 
26 FSB, Guidance on Systemic Risk (November 2009). 
27 ibid.  
28 J. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: 
Yale UP, 1998). 
29 K. Weick, Sense Making in Organisations (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1995). 
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made to the micro-prudential supervision of individual financial institutions.  
Surveillance is important, but until those links are better understood it remains 
only a partial basis for dynamic adjustment of the regulatory regime to the changes 
in risk profiles of products, markets, and actors that comprise the financial system. 
 
RESILIENCE 
 
Secondly, regulators are struggling to find ways to enhance the resilience of the 
financial system.  There are strong arguments for making resilience an essential 
part of risk regulation; indeed some argue that it should be the dominant strategy 
for responding to uncertainty.30  Wildavsky, for example, argues that as we cannot 
know which risks will crystallise, we should proceed on the basis of trial and error, 
and ensuring resilience in systems if things should go wrong.  In engineering 
terms, and particularly when dealing with complex systems, regulators should 
ensure that systems have built-in buffers between parts that may fail to prevent a 
failure in one part affecting other parts, and ‘redundancies’, controls which come 
into operation when others have failed.31   
The rationale for regulating banks has always focused on the potential for the 
failure of one institution to have systemic consequences, but the channels for that 
systemic crisis have traditionally been seen to be inter-linkages through the 
payment system and inter-bank market, and through contagion effects arising 
from loss of investor confidence (failure of one bank can cause depositors to 
create runs on other banks).32  The regulatory system has traditionally built in 
resilience through the lender of last resort facility, and failing that, through the 
contained collapse or managed takeover of the bank.  The crisis showed that in 
many countries there was no further backstop plan. There were no legal structures 
in place which were adequate to the task of managing the failure of a bank.  Those 
that existed were based on an assumption that bank failures could be managed 
within national boundaries; there were no robust cross-border procedures.  In 
some cases, for example the UK, putting these structures in place had been on 
policymakers’ ‘to do’ lists, but in the benign macro-economic environment that 
prevailed, they were not seen as particularly urgent matters that needed priority.33 
Building in resilience to the financial system is proving an extremely 
challenging task.  That said, part of the battle is relatively straightforward, at least 
conceptually.  It involves enhancing the types of resiliency structures and 
mechanisms that already existed, or creating new techniques which follow the 
same logic and understandings of how the financial system works as operated in 
the past.  These include the introduction of special legal regimes for the failure of 
                                                     
30 A. Wildavsky, Searching for Safety (London: Transaction Books, 1988). 
31 C. Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (New York: Basic Books, 1984). 
32 C. Goodhart, et al, Financial Regulation: Where, Why, How and What Now? (London: Routledge, 1998) 
33 In the UK the Tripartite Authorities had conducted a series of ‘war games’ on the possible failures of 
different banks which had revealed the weaknesses in the UK regulatory structure for managing the 
failure of a large bank, but the matter had not been pushed up the legislative agenda: Treasury Select 
Committee, The Run on the Rock (5th Report of Session 2007-8 HC 56-1). 
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banks, such as the UK’s Special Resolution Regime,34 now being adopted in some 
form in the US and the EU,35 the requirements, initiated in the UK, for firms to 
produce ‘living wills’ or ‘resolution plans’,36 and initiatives to enhance the cross-
border crisis management and the resolution of cross-border banks.37   
The hardest part of the battle is coming to grips with the realisation that the 
system simply did not operate in the way that regulators, banks, and economists 
had thought it did.  If you do not understand how the system works, it is very hard 
to build in mechanisms either for managing risk or for ensuring the system’s 
resilience when those risks crystallise.  As emphasised above, the crisis has 
prompted fundamental cognitive shifts in understandings of how the financial 
system operates.  Regulators and others are struggling to create a new cognitive 
framework in which to develop policy responses.    
As a result there is less consensus on issues that had previously been almost 
unquestioned.  What characteristics mark out a ‘systemically important’ financial 
institution, for example, are now recognised to be only poorly understood.  Few 
now consider size to be the main risk factor; interconnectedness, leverage, or 
maturity mismatches are seen to be more significant, but exactly how significant is 
contested.  Asset management and money market funds are now seen to pose 
systemic threats, whereas previously they were well outside the systemic regulator’s 
radar, but just how great a threat is also a matter of dispute.38    
There is also a deeper conflict as to how systemic significance is created.  
Views differ as to whether systemic significance is determined by certain 
properties of financial institutions and their interactions that can be identified ex 
ante or whether systemic significance is in fact a dynamic phenomenon produced 
by particular configurations of market interactions: certain institutions become 
systemic in the course of a crisis.39  The first obviously is more comforting for 
policy makers, as it gives a reassuring sense of predictability and therefore control; 
the latter far less so.   
Linked to these cognitive shifts is the realisation that the technologies of risk 
management that both regulators and financial institutions had used were deeply 
inadequate, if not fundamentally flawed.  They also gave regulators and firms a 
highly distorted view of the nature and distribution of risks in the financial system.  
There is widespread recognition that liquidity risk was underestimated.40  As was 
                                                     
34 Banking Act 2009. 
35 Dodd-Frank Act 2010 in the US; European Commission, ‘Communication on an EU Framework for 
Cross-Border Crisis Management in the Banking Sector’ (October 2009). 
36 FSA, ‘Turner Review Conference Discussion Paper’ (DP09/4, October 2009); BCBS, Report and 
Recommendations of the Cross Border Bank Resolution Group (Basle, March 2010). 
37 ibid; European Commission, n 35 above. 
38 FSB, ‘Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments: 
Initial Considerations − Background Paper’ (November 2009). 
39 For example the discussions as to whether there should be a list of systemically important financial 
institutions identified in advance or not: eg IMF, Responding to the Financial Crisis and Measuring Systemic 
Risks (Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, 2009) 
40 eg de Larosiere Report, The High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, at 
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leverage: risk-adjusted leverage measures failed to capture the multiples of 
exposure created by pooling and tranching structured credit instruments, or the 
compounding of that embedded leverage through re-securitisation.41  Further, 
there is dawning awareness that although regulators and risk managers can tend to 
put risks into ‘buckets’: market, credit, liquidity, and so on, risks can quickly 
overspill from one to the other: liquidity risk quickly evolved into market and 
credit risk, as lack of liquidity caused a drop in market value and prevented firms 
from rolling over short-term borrowing.42 
Risk models were also found to be deeply flawed.  Value at Risk (VaR) 
models, the darling of risk managers and banking regulators since the early 1990s, 
were found to have procyclical effects as their measures of market risks fell during 
the boom, creating incentives to take on additional risk and leverage.  Once the 
market turns, falling asset prices leads to higher asset price volatility and higher 
measures of VaR, creating incentives to deleverage.  As all follow the same 
models, there is a herd effect, further enhancing volatility.  As a result there are 
now calls for VaR models to ‘see through the cycle’.43  Model-based risk 
assessments were also based on limited historical data, often restricted to the 
‘Golden Decade’ of the last ten years that had seen particularly benign economic 
conditions.44  Even worse, in the case of residential mortgage-backed securities, 
they were based on no empirical data at all.45  Correlation risks were not 
understood, again particularly with respect to CDOs.46  Stress tests were woefully 
inadequate.  Even in late 2007, before the most intense periods of the crisis, the 
Chief Financial Officer of Goldman Sachs, David Viniar, was reported as 
commenting that events that were in most models assumed to happen only once 
in several billion years (once every 6 x 10124 lives of the universe in fact) were 
happening several days in a row.  Models will always be wrong to an extent, but as 
Andrew Haldane commented, the models failed Keynes’ test, which is that it is 
better to be roughly right than precisely wrong.  ‘With hindsight, these models 
were both very precise and very wrong’.47   
Moreover, it has been recognised that regulation does not operate as a neutral 
instrument, but can create negative feedback loops, amplifying the very risks they 
are meant to be controlling.  The potential procyclical effects of Basle II have long 
been noted,48 but their effects were not fully felt; this was predominantly a crisis 
                                                                                                                                       
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf; FSF, n 23 above.  
41 Joint FSF-CGFS Working Group, The Role of Valuation and Leverage in Procyclicality (March 2009); 
CRMPG III, Containing Systemic Risk: The Road to Reform (2008). 
42 eg Joint Forum, Credit Risk Transfer – Developments from 2005-2007 (April 2008). 
43 ibid. 
44 ibid; A. Haldane, ‘Why Banks Failed the Stress Test’ (speech delivered 13 February 2009). 
45 Joint Forum, n 42 above. 
46 ibid.  In particular, the exposure of senior tranches of CDOs to worst-case correlations (eg recession in 
the macro-economy) as that generates the largest losses on the underlying portfolio. 
47 Haldane, n 44 above. 
48 eg J. Danielsson, et al, ‘An Academic Response to Basle II’ (Special Paper 130, Financial Markets 
Group, LSE, 2001); C. Goodhart, ‘Financial Regulation, Credit Risk and Financial Stability’ (2005) 192 
National Institute Economic Review 118; C. Goodhart, B. Hofmann, and M. Segoviano, ‘Bank Regulation and 
Macroeconomic Fluctuations’ (2005) 20 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 591. 
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that occurred under Basle I rules.  However, the failure of the leverage measures 
to capture the full extent of leverage or the multiples of exposure incentivised 
greater leverage and did nothing to abate the risk concentrations that were 
accumulating.  The problems did not only lie with capital rules for banks.  
Accounting rules on loan loss provisioning based on incurred losses, and in 
particular mark-to-market accounting requirements have been shown to have 
profoundly procyclical effects.49  Private sector risk management techniques had 
the same impact, enhancing the links between valuation techniques, leverage, and 
asset prices.  Triggers in debt or OTC derivative contracts and haircuts on 
financing transactions based on market valuations or credit ratings added liquidity 
during the boom but drained it out when conditions were stressed, exacerbating 
deleveraging and asset sales in a vicious downward spiral.50 
 
STABILITY 
 
Thirdly, there is a focus on developing strategies for macro-economic stability.  
Here too there has been a significant cognitive shift.  In particular there is a 
recognition of the inter-linking and inter-dependencies between the stability of 
macro-economy and the stability both of individual financial institutions and of 
the financial system as a whole.  The mechanisms of these inter-linkages are still 
only partly understood, but there is broad agreement emerging on four issues.51  
Firstly, that ensuring stability of each individual bank (and thereby the protection 
of its depositors) cannot be ensured just by looking at the performance and 
activities of that institution but is intrinsically linked to developments in the wider 
economy and in the markets: the stability of the financial system is linked to 
stability of the macro-economic system, and vice versa (the macro-micro issue).  
Secondly, that ensuring the stability of one does not ensure the stability of the 
whole (the interconnectedness issue).  Thirdly, though more tentatively, that 
financial stability is not a ‘banks only’ issue but is affected by the activities of all 
market players, including those not normally within the remit of banking 
supervisors, such as hedge funds, OTC dealings, insurance and reinsurance 
companies, and mutual funds (the silo issue).52  
There is far less consensus on the policy implications that should flow from 
these diagnoses, however.  There are significant divides on key issues, for example 
whether banks should be broken up and how;53 whether monetary authorities or 
                                                     
49 FSB, Working Group on Loan Loss Provisioning; FSF-BCBS, Joint Working Group on Capital (March 
2009); de Larosiere Report, n 40 above; Joint FSF-CGFS Working Group, n 41 above. 
50 Joint FSF-CGFS Working Group, ibid; Joint Forum, n 42 above. 
51 FSF, n 23 above.  
52 A development illustrating this cognitive shift is IOSCO’s recent creation of a research group to 
investigate systemic risk in the securities markets, previously considered to be an issue confined to banks. 
Its initial focus is hedge funds, and it has sent out a data collecting template to funds for them to 
complete.  IOSCO/MR/03/2010. 
53 eg the ‘Volcker’ rule provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act 2010; the UK banking commission inquiry.  
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financial supervisors can spot ‘bubbles’ and have the political authority to pierce 
them;54 what the relationship is between monetary policy and financial 
supervision;55 whether trade imbalances can and should be addressed;56 and 
whether short selling should be prohibited either at all or by certain actors, or in 
certain markets or instruments, such as commodity derivatives (US) or ‘naked’ 
short-selling of sovereign debt (Germany).57   
 
ORGANISATIONAL RESTRUCTURING AND REGIME MANAGEMENT 
 
Fourthly, there is a concern to put in place institutional structures which can 
develop and deliver a regulatory system that will ensure that these battles are 
successfully fought at every level, from international committees, through regional 
and national systems of regulation, down to firms’ internal governance structures.  
Here too there has been a cognitive reframing, but this time as to the needs, 
capacities, and resources of different actors in the regulatory system, the nature of 
their inter-linkages and interdependencies, and the negative feedback loops and 
externalities that thereby can be created.   
As explained above, regulatory capacity is a combination of the possession of 
certain key resources and the ability and willingness to deploy those resources in 
pursuit of a certain set of normative goals.  Critical resources are information, 
organisational capacity, expertise, financial resources, strategic position, and 
legitimacy and authority.  The crisis demonstrated that regulators did not have 
adequate information nor did they have a means of making sense of what they 
had.  They did not have sufficient technologies to manage and regulate risks.  They 
did not have the organisational capacities to coordinate and perform regulation in 
conjunction with other national authorities or overseas regulators.  The strategic 
position of those purporting to perform regulation, over firms or other regulators, 
was often weak.58  At the international level, and indeed at the EU level, there are 
significant questions of the legitimacy and authority of some those purporting to 
manage the regulatory regime by those they hope to manage.   
There are four discernible themes in the current organisational realignments.  
First, there are ‘re-centrings’ occurring: changes in the distribution of regulatory 
                                                     
54 D. Gruen, M. Plumb, and A. Stone, ‘How Should Monetary Policy Respond to Asset Price Bubbles?’ 
(2005) 1 International Journal of Central Banking 1; J. Dokko, et al, ‘Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble’ 
(Federal Reserve Board, Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2009-49).  
55 Davies and Green, n 3 above, ch 3. 
56 R. Portes, ‘Global Imbalances’ in M. Dewatripint, X. Freixas, and R. Portes (eds), Macro Economic 
Stability and Financial Regulation: Key Issues for the G20 (London: Centre for Economic and Policy Research, 
2009); S. Dunaway, ‘Global Imbalances and the Financial Crisis’ (Special Report No 44, Council of 
Foreign Relations, March 2009); H. Davies, The Financial Crisis: Who is to Blame?  (London: Polity Press, 
2010). 
57 Compare eg Dodd-Frank Act 2010; the German banning of naked short selling of sovereign debt in 
May 2010 prompted the Commission to adopt EU wide measures: European Commission, ‘Proposal for 
a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Short Selling and Certain Aspects of 
Credit Default Swaps’ (September 2010); see also CESR, ‘Measures Adopted by Member States on Short 
Selling – Updated’ (CESR/08-742, September 2010). 
58 See for example, FSF, n 23 above; FSA, n 1 above.  
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powers and functions between actors within the system and attempts by various 
actors in the system to pull more regulatory powers back to themselves.  These are 
happening at the national level as national governments reorganise their national 
systems of regulation.59  They are evident at the regional level, as the EU radically 
restructures its regulatory regime and the balance of responsibilities and powers 
between the EU and member states.  They are occurring at the international level, 
as participation is broadened and functions redistributed between the ‘siloed’ 
international committees and the coordinating role of the Financial Services 
Board.  They are also visible within firms themselves, as regulators focus in far 
more detail on the internal governance structures of firms, and on the role of 
shareholders within them.60    
Secondly, there is a re-evaluation of the regulatory capacities and resources of 
different participants within the regime, including regulated firms and other 
market actors.  In particular there is a growing recognition that regulators do not 
have the resources necessary by way of information, tools and technologies, 
organisational capacities, leverage, and, at the international level in particular, 
legitimacy and authority to perform regulation effectively.  However, this is also 
matched by a recognition that firms and markets do not possess these resources 
either.61  In many areas self-regulation is politically dead, or at least in intensive 
care. 62  The OTC derivative markets, credit rating agencies, and hedge funds are 
all finding the regulators’ spotlights turned firmly on them, though often for very 
different reasons.63  Firms’ internal governance structures and remuneration 
policies are also firmly in the regulators’ sights.64    
                                                     
59 For example Ireland, Germany, the UK, and the US. 
60 eg D. Walker, A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other Financial Industry Entities – Final 
Recommendations (November 2009).  
61 eg Senior Supervisors Group, Observations on Risk Management Practices during the Recent Market Turbulence 
(March 2008); ibid, Risk Management Lessons from the Global Banking Crisis of 2008 (October 2009);  OECD, 
Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis: Key Findings and Main Messages (June 2009).  
62 However, in other respects, there is still reliance on private market actors to perform significant 
coordinating roles.  A key example is the role of ISDA, not only in developing the standard form 
contracts on which the derivatives markets are built, but in providing a coordinated mechanism for 
settlement of contracts at the height of the crisis.  Its ‘big bang’ protocol incorporated into its standard 
documentation the auction settlement of contracts after a default or other credit event on a company 
referenced in credit default swap transactions: Auction Supplement to the 2003 ISDA Credit Derivatives 
Definitions (the ‘Big Bang Protocol’); 2009 ISDA Credit Derivatives Determinations Committees, 
Auction Settlement and Restructuring CDS Protocol (the ‘Small Bang Protocol’).  Notably, in an attempt 
by  ISDA to control the interpretation of its contracts and not leave this to the courts in individual 
jurisdictions, the protocols include provision for the ISDA Determinations Committee to  make binding 
determinations for issues such as whether a credit event has occurred; whether an auction will be held; 
and whether a particular obligation is deliverable.  The auction process provided a crucial and largely 
successful mechanism for settling transactions at the height of the crisis.  ISDA, however, remains 
outside the main coordinating body of international regulators, the Financial Stability Board, a point to 
which we will return below.  On the question of who should have the interpretive authority over ISDA 
contracts, and in particular the role of the courts, see J. Golden, ‘The Future of Financial Regulation: The 
Role of the Courts’ in I. MacNeil and J. O'Brien (eds), The Future of Financial Regulation (Oxford: OUP, 
2010). 
63 See the US Dodd-Frank Act 2010; in the EU see, Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on Credit Rating Agencies; EU Commission, Proposal for a Directive Of 
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Third, and linked to this, are changes in patterns of enrolment, in particular 
the role of credit rating agencies.  Much attention has been given to the reliance 
that investors placed on ratings and there have been calls from regulators for 
investors to perform their own due diligence.65  However, the regulatory system 
has been just as negligent.  In significant areas, credit ratings are hardwired into the 
regulatory regime, often acting as thresholds or triggers for regulatory action.  In 
the EU, for example, the investment portfolios permitted for collective investment 
schemes are defined in terms of products with certain credit ratings.66  The 
standardised approach introduced under Pillar 1 of Basle II relies on credit ratings 
of borrowers assigned by ‘external credit assessment institutions’ (ECAIs) where 
these are available to compute banks’ regulatory capital for credit risk.  It has been 
estimated that 30 per cent of European banks will adopt this approach; the figure 
is higher outside the EU.67  Central banks have relied on credit ratings to 
determine what they will accept as collateral.68   
Enrolment can confer benefits, extending regulatory capacity.  However, as 
the crisis has demonstrated, enrolment can enhance regulatory capacity but it also 
creates significant dependencies and vulnerabilities.69  Moreover it can create 
negative feedback loops, as illustrated in the effects of the mark-to-market 
accounting rules noted above.  It can also create opportunities for gaming the 
regulatory rules – as where banks guaranteed the liabilities of their SPVs, which 
gained a high credit rating as a consequence.  Banks then bought the commercial 
paper of their SPVs, relying on the high credit rating to reduce their capital 
requirements.70  There is thus a significant re-evaluation of the nature and extent 
of this particular enrolment relationship.  Credit rating agencies are now to be 
regulated within the EU.71  Central banks have indicated that they will no longer 
                                                                                                                                       
The European Parliament and of the Council on Alternative Investment Fund Managers, COM(2009) 
207 (Final). 
64 eg FSB, Principles for Sound Compensation Practices (2009); EU Commission, ‘Green Paper on  Corporate 
Governance in Financial Institutions and Remuneration Policies’, COM(2010) 284 final (June 2010);   
65 eg FSF, n 23 above, 37-38; CESR, Second Report to the European Commission on the Compliance of Credit 
Rating Agencies with the IOSCO Code and the Role of Credit Rating Agencies in Structured Finance (CESR/08-277, 
May 2008); ESME, Report to the European Commission on the Role of Credit Rating Agencies (4 June 2008); FSB, 
Improving Financial Regulation: Report of the Financial Stability Board to G20 Leaders (September 2009). 
66 DG Market Services, Tackling the Problem of Over Reliance on Ratings (2009).  
67 P. Van Roy, ‘Credit Ratings and the Standardised Approach to Credit Ratings in Basle II’ (ECB 
Working Paper Series, No 217, August 2005); FSI, ‘2008 FSI Survey on the Implementation of the New 
Capital Adequacy Framework in Non-Basel Committee Member Countries’ (BIS 2008). 
68 For example, the European Central Bank only accepted ‘A’ rated products; however, as the Greek crisis 
has demonstrated, in times of crisis this strict stance may have to be adjusted, and the ECB has had to say 
it will accept Greek bonds regardless of their rating. Financial Times (5 May 2010). 
69 Indeed, the crisis and its aftermath have demonstrated the fundamental reliance of monetary 
authorities on banks to act as sluice gates to push money out into the economy; when banks refuse to do 
so, monetary authorities are almost paralysed. 
70 BCBS, Enhancements to the Basle II Framework (July 2009); the revised rules now introduce a ban on banks 
recognising ratings gained through such guarantees.   
71  Regulation (EC), n 63 above, on credit rating agencies. 
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rely on credit ratings agencies to determine what collateral they will accept.72  
Under the revised Basle II requirements on securitisation exposure have been 
amended to include requirements to ensure that banks perform their own due 
diligence and do not simply rely on credit ratings given by the agencies.73 
Fourthly, new actors are being created, existing ones reconstituted, and 
relationships between regulators are being rearticulated and reformed.  As detailed 
further below, the IMF is being given a far wider role in global financial regulation, 
though whether its current mandate supports that expectation is a matter of 
debate.  The FSB has been reconstituted.  New multi-lateral groupings of 
regulators have been formed to manage banks in life, in the form of colleges of 
supervisors, and in death, in the form of crisis-resolution groups.  Within the EU, 
there are significant changes being introduced to the regulatory structures and a 
parallel formation of multilateral colleges and crisis-resolution mechanisms.  
Throughout these restructurings there is a notable thread running, which is that 
there needs to be a greater focus on managing the regime as a whole.  However, 
this management process is fraught with difficulties, all of which have a bearing on 
the ability of the regime and its different components to develop capacities for 
reflexive self-observation (capacity to know how the regime itself is performing) 
and dynamic responsiveness (ability to adapt rapidly to changes in the market and 
its own performance).   
 
 
 
EMERGING STRUCTURES OF COORDINATION: 
THE GLOBAL LEVEL 
 
We are still in the midst of the aftershocks of the crisis and so the situation is in a 
state of flux.  Nevertheless, the main contours of the restructuring of the global 
and EU financial regulatory regimes are emerging.  At the global level there have 
been three key developments in the structure and management of the regulatory 
system.  These are the extension and enhancement of the central coordinating 
body, the Financial Stability Board, the new role of the IMF, and the creation of 
colleges of supervisors: multi-lateral supervisory arrangements for firms in normal 
times and times of crisis.  At the EU level, legislation that will radically restructure 
the relationship between the EU and member states in financial regulation is in its 
late legislative stages.74  This section considers each of these, asking whether and 
                                                     
72 Bank of England, Financial Stability Report (December 2009) on the need to reduce reliance on credit 
ratings in capital adequacy regulation; on collateral see Bank of England, Market Notice – Expanding Eligible 
Collateral In The Discount Window Facility And Information Transparency For Asset-Backed Securities (July 2010).  
73 BCBS, n 70 above. 
74 At the time of writing, the Council of Ministers is due to consider the legislation with a view to 
implementation by January 2011. 
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how these developments are likely to enhance the capacity of the global and EU 
regulatory regimes for reflexive learning and responsive adaptation.   
 
FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD – ‘HEAD OF GLOBAL’? 
 
Potentially the most significant change in the organisational structures of global 
financial regulation has been the reconstitution of the Financial Stability Forum 
(FSF) into the Financial Stability Board (FSB).75  Its membership has widened to 
include the G20 countries and the European Commission.  Its role is also 
changing from one of a loose coordinator to putative regime manager and 
regulator.76  There have also been suggestions that it may break out of the usual 
communicative circle of regulators and international bodies and engage directly 
with financial institutions.77   
The transformation of the FSF from a loose coordinator to regime manager 
and even direct regulator is not a straightforward one, and it is not clear either that 
it is desirable or that it will be achieved.  The FSF, the FSB’s predecessor, was 
itself born out of a crisis, the near collapse and rescue of Long Term Capital 
Management.  Although seen as a significant crisis at the time, LTCM was a minor 
local difficulty in comparison with the events of 2007-2009.  The Forum was a 
delicately struck balance between the interests of national governments, national 
regulatory authorities, central banks, the international financial institutions (the 
IMF and the World Bank), the existing international committees of regulators, and 
various other inter-governmental bodies, notably the EU, ECB, and the OECD.78  
Its creation was in part a further step in the search for coordination between the 
existing international committees of securities, banking, insurance, and accounting 
regulators and other global actors.  However, by introducing financial ministers 
directly into the structure it also forced politicians and regulators to confront each 
other at the international level.79   
The extension of membership of the FSB to G20 countries gives it greater 
legitimacy as an overall coordinator and even standard-setter for a wider group of 
countries, but complicates its dynamics.  It is not yet clear whether it is a political 
body that is an arm of the G20 or a separate institution with its own institutional 
identity, position, and agenda, and thus akin to the other international committees 
of regulators.  Moreover, clearly tensions exist between the members, though at 
                                                     
75 G20, Declaration Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy (15 November 2008); this also 
prompted the expansion in the membership of the BCBS to the G20 countries.  According to the de 
Larosiere Report, the G20 initiative originated with the EU Commission, which was keen to ensure it had 
adequate involvement in the international standard-setting bodies: de Larosiere Report, n 40 above, para 
220. 
76 On the role of the FSF in its early years, see Davies and Green, n 14 above, 113-118. 
77 FSF, n 23 above. 
78 It was formed at the proposal of Hans Tietmeyer, then President of the German Bundesbank, after an 
inquiry instigated by the BIS. H. Tietmeyer, Report on International Cooperation and Coordination in the Area of 
Financial Market Supervision and Surveillance (BIS, 1999).  For a discussion of the FSF’s work and the 
problems of its institutional position, see Davies and Green, n 14 above, 113-118. 
79 Davies and Green, ibid, 117-118.  
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present these are not paralysing.  The FSB comprises politicians, international 
organisations, international organisations of national regulators, and national 
regulators.  Some of its members are hosts to significant financial markets, others, 
such as Argentina, have almost none.  Finance ministers can be expected to pursue 
their own national agendas, and are shaping the global regulatory agenda in a way 
that they have arguably not done since the decision to set up the first Basle Capital 
Accord.80  However, there can be tensions with the international committees of 
regulators who find their technocratic world now politicised in unpredictable ways.  
Furthermore the presence of both international organisations and a selective 
group of their members can create uneasy dynamics.  The Larosiere Report, for 
example, indicated frustration that some of the EU member states have a separate 
voice at the international level and can use these international fora to oppose and 
outmanoeuvre it.  It argued that only the EU should be represented in 
international organisations, including the FSB,81 though this is not a suggestion 
that has been adopted with the alacrity of some of its other recommendations.  
Others have criticised the over-representation of EU member states, though for 
different reasons.82   
The membership of the FSB was a political decision taken in the heat of the 
crisis, though, not the result of careful planning and consideration of what should 
be the criteria for membership.  Further, whatever its composition, like other 
international organisations there will be tensions between members as each 
national government pursues its own national agenda and interests.  The financial 
markets take a different form in each country, and have different lobbying powers, 
both of which shape the policy agendas each state is pursuing at the international 
level.  National governments recognise the need for international harmonisation 
but are reluctant to surrender sovereignty to international financial institutions.   
The FSB has to manage these tensions.  Its reformulation as an independent 
actor is one that is in its infancy, and the process of developing its own identity as 
an organisation, distinct from the aggregate views and interests of its members, 
will evolve over time.  Nevertheless there are signs that the FSB is being 
positioned as regime manager by the G20 governments, and is positioning itself in 
this role.  In particular, it is expected to develop a role in systemic surveillance, 
together with the BIS and the IMF.  It is developing a greater role as a standard-
setter, formulating principles for regulators to implement.  It is also actively 
developing a role in promoting and overseeing the implementation of international 
financial regulation by national governments, both G20 and non-G20 member 
states.    
 
 
                                                     
80 See E. Kapstein, ‘Resolving the Regulator's Dilemma: International Coordination of Banking 
Regulations’ (1989) 43 International Organisation 323; Davies and Green, n 14, 34-39. 
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FSB as a regulator: Setting standards 
The international financial regulatory committees have been enthusiastic standard-
setters since their various inceptions.  The principles and rules they issued were 
directed at member state regulators and focused both on the organisation and 
operation of regulation by national governments and their regulatory authorities, 
including central banks (for example requirements that regulators be independent 
and transparent), and on the regulation of market actors (for example, IOSCO’s 
principles for the regulation of credit rating agencies).  The FSB’s predecessor, the 
FSF, was content largely to leave the function of standard-setting to the existing 
international organisations, principally IOSCO, the BCBS, the IAIS, and the IASB.  
However, since its reconstitution in 2008 it has become a standard-setter itself.  It 
has issued two sets of Principles in the last six months (on remuneration and 
cross-border crisis management), more than it did in the last 10 years in its old 
formulation as the Financial Stability Forum.  Pre-crisis, the FSF issued 
recommendations but otherwise simply compiled a compendium of a selected set 
of principles issued by others.83   
The issuance of the FSB’s principles could be viewed as simply a pragmatic 
allocation of functions between the different organisations that are involved in the 
international financial regulatory regime.  They could have been issued by any or 
all of the other sectoral regulatory organisations, but as they apply to all financial 
institutions it makes sense for the FSB to issue them.  However, it is suggested 
that there is a deeper significance to this development.  It is important to 
recognise the different roles that principles can play in any regulatory regime, 
including the international financial regulatory regime.  They are not simply 
regulatory instruments used in an attempt to affect behaviour.  They can have a 
broader role and significance.  First, they have symbolic significance: they are used 
to establish their authors’ own institutional position within the regulatory regime.   
Secondly, they have a broader functional role: not just to regulate the behaviour of 
market actors but to be used in the monitoring and assessment of the regime’s 
own performance.  Principles are increasingly being used as benchmarks of 
performance against which national regulatory regimes are assessed, and thus as 
criteria of accountability.84  Consequently, the development of the FSB’s role as 
standard-setter is a step towards establishing its position as overall coordinator, 
manager, and enforcer of the international regulatory regime.    
However, the process of developing principles is not necessarily a linear, 
hierarchical, ‘flow down from the top’ process, but more complex.  The 
development of principles on remuneration provides a good recent illustration of 
the dynamics of ‘principles production’ in this polycentric system of financial 
regulation, and of the challenges facing the FSB if it wants to become ‘head of 
global’.  Despite the rhetoric of the need for greater international coordination and 
harmonisation, the UK’s FSA was a ‘first mover’, declaring that it was prepared to 
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act unilaterally.  It issued its draft code on remuneration in February 2009.  This 
was followed by the communiqué from the G20 that principles governing 
remuneration should be developed.  As a consequence, the Financial Stability 
Forum (as it still was) issued its Principles on Sound Compensation Practices in 
April 2009, followed by Implementation Standards for the Principles in September 
2009.  Two of the international committees of regulators, IOSCO (securities) and 
the BCBS (banking) are developing proposals to implement these Principles.  
Separately, regulators in Australia, Switzerland, France, and the Netherlands 
published principles on remuneration practices, broadly following the FSF’s, and 
the US indicated its intention to do so.  Meanwhile, various initiatives were 
emanating from the EU.  The Committee of European Banking Supervisors 
(CEBS) issued the final version of its high-level principles on remuneration just 
after the FSB in April 2009, and the Commission published a recommendation,85 
and draft amendments, to the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD).  These were 
formalised and sent to the EU Parliament and Council in July 2009.86  None of 
these principles are exactly aligned with one another.  The FSA code, for example, 
is broadly aligned to the FSB’s principles, but is ‘super-equivalent’ in a number of 
respects.87  Further, notwithstanding the fact that the FSA will have to implement 
the CRD’s eventual provisions on remuneration, it decided that should act 
unilaterally and in advance of any EU provisions that may eventually emerge.  The 
FSA’s Code on Remuneration was finalised in October 2009 and came into force 
in January 2010.  The picture was further complicated by the EU Commission’s 
announcement in July 2010 to develop legal rules on remuneration.88   
The process demonstrates the ‘multi-authorship’ of principles, and the 
multiple roles that individual regulators play in each of these rule-writing fora: the 
FSA, for example, is both contributing author of and subject to the principles 
emanating from the FSB, IOSCO, BCBS, and CEBS.  It also illustrates the 
difficulties of system management and the lack of coordination that can 
characterise norm formation in polycentric systems, as each regulator wants to 
develop its own norms to suit its own local conditions and priorities.   
 
Peer review - Monitoring, assessment, and putative enforcement 
Setting principles may be a necessary part of regulation but it is by no means 
sufficient.  As all regulators know, the greater challenge is ensuring they are 
complied with.  One of the outcomes of the crisis was a recognition that national 
regulation itself can be a source of negative externalities, adversely affecting other 
countries’ fiscal positions, and thus their taxpayers.  The goal of international 
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harmonisation of regulation is thus no longer pursued simply to prevent the 
regulatory equivalent of the market for lemons emerging, in which regulatory 
arbitrage by firms leads either to countries with high quality, and high cost, 
regulatory regimes being bypassed by financial markets, and /or to a ‘race to the 
bottom’, in which regulatory standards converge at the lowest level to the 
detriment of broader social and economic goals.  Whilst these concerns are still 
present, there is now the additional motivation arising from the recognition that 
the manner in which regulation is conducted in one country can have other 
negative spillover effects affecting not just the country’s share of the financial 
market, but the stability of its financial system as a whole.   
Negative spillovers can be caused through one-off, unilateral actions, as the 
example of Ireland’s extension of its deposit guarantee for Irish banks illustrates.  
But negative spillovers can arise from more deep-rooted failures of national 
financial regulation which are transmitted to other countries by global financial 
systems.  Thus did the Florida dream turn into a global nightmare.  It is not only 
global markets that can transmit the consequences of national financial failures.  
They also can be transmitted through channels created by the design of regulation 
itself.  In the EU and EEA, for example, the passporting system was put in place 
to facilitate cross-border banking.  It became a transmission belt for cross-border 
instability, as the collapse of the Icelandic banks illustrated.89 
As a consequence, whether or not a national government is implementing 
internationally agreed regulatory standards is no longer a matter of concern 
principally to the international organisations of regulators who issue and monitor 
them.  It is now recognised to be a matter of direct concern to all national 
governments.  As the FSB has observed: ‘[f]inancial markets are global in scope 
and, therefore, consistent implementation of international standards is necessary 
to protect against adverse cross-border, regional and global developments 
affecting international financial stability.’90 Moreover, whether or not there is 
compliance is no longer seen to be a matter that can remain private to the 
government and the international monitors, in the way that information about a 
firm’s compliance record remains restricted to it and its regulator until 
enforcement action is taken.  Rather it is information that all need to know, as the 
financial stability of one country can be dependent on the regulatory performance 
of another.   
From a global, system-wide perspective, it is thus significant that the G20 
member states have now agreed to submit their national financial regulatory 
regimes to assessment by the international financial institutions, and for those 
assessments to be published.  These assessments have of course been carried out 
for a number of years by the IMF and the World Bank in their Reports on the 
Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC), which form part of the Financial 
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Sector Assessment Program (FSAP).  The reviews have been concerned with 
compliance with IMF codes on fiscal and monetary transparency as well as with a 
selection of principles concerning the organisation, content, and operation of 
national financial regulatory regimes.  However, the drive for all members to be 
reviewed and for reports to be published will require some changes in the attitudes 
of national governments to the review processes.  There are signs that this will not 
be an easy process, however, as different countries have already demonstrated that 
they are more open to criticism than others.  Three of the new FSB members had 
not previously agreed to being assessed: Indonesia, China, and the USA.  Reviews 
of them are currently underway.  Not all have previously agreed to have their 
reports published (eg Brazil, and Russia for its 2008 report).  Ten countries had 
only agreed to have their reports published in summary form, including Germany, 
Mexico, Japan, and Singapore.  All are now expected to agree to publication.91 
Under the ROSC and FSAP processes, the FSF’s role was limited to 
assembling the compendium of such principles.  In contrast, the FSB is now being 
positioned by the G20, and is positioning itself, at the centre of this monitoring 
and assessment process by establishing its own separate system of peer reviews.  
The FSB is putting in place a system of peer review monitoring for members to be 
conducted on a country and thematic basis.92  The first thematic review has 
already been completed, on the actions taken by firms and national authorities to 
implement the FSB Principles and Implementation Standards for Sound 
Compensation Practices.93  Priority is also being given to compliance with the 
principles contained in various codes of BCBS, IOSCO, and IAIS concerning 
international cooperation and information exchange.  The peer reviews will be 
conducted separately from the FSAP and ROSC processes, although the intention 
is to reinforce the ROSC and FSAPs by ensuring that recommendations made in 
those reports are implemented.94  Notably, however, the review process will also 
focus on monitoring implementation with the FSB’s own principles, not just those 
of the other committees.   
The added value of the peer review process, the FSB hopes, will come from 
‘the cross-sector, cross-functional, system-wide perspective brought by its 
members’ and from dialogue with peers’.95  Peer reviews will be the responsibility 
of the FSB’s Standing Committee on Standards Implementation.  However, the 
final responsibility for approving FSB peer reviews lies with the Plenary, as the 
decision-making body of the FSB.  Peer review reports and any commentaries 
provided by the reviewed jurisdictions will be published.  Following publication of 
                                                     
91 The first country peer review was recently completed of Mexico: FSB, Country Review of Mexico - Peer 
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the report, jurisdictions’ implementation of agreed actions will be monitored by 
the FSB and, if implementation lags, peer pressure may be applied.96  The initial 
focus of the FSB is on jurisdictions that could pose a risk to financial stability 
because of their importance in the financial system and their weak adherence to 
the relevant standards.  It will evaluate areas of weakness, consider cooperation 
with international assessment processes, examine where further information is 
needed, identify priorities for reform, and recommend actions to address 
weaknesses.97  Capacity-building mechanisms will be made available to provide 
technical assistance.    
There is an ambiguity in the role of peer reviews, however, as to whether they 
are primarily aimed at providing technical assistance or whether they are aimed at 
ensuring compliance.  The FSB’s stance at present is tending towards the latter.  
However the FSB has no direct means of promoting or enforcing compliance, 
though it has indicated that it will name and shame those who are not compliant.   
It is nonetheless developing a ‘toolbox’ of positive and negative measures that 
could be deployed.98  This comprises a combination of carrots and sticks (and 
some orange-painted, carrot-shaped sticks).  At the softer end are ‘compliance’-
based strategies such as advice and technical assistance.  Moving up the sanctions 
pyramid,99 borrowing from IOSCO, the FSB suggests that those who are not 
adherent should sign a multilateral MOU on information sharing and cooperation 
as a condition of membership of various international bodies or their working 
groups (but note that it does not include membership of itself in its list of 
examples, raising questions as to the extent that the FSB as an organisation 
separate from the G20 can determine its own membership).100  It suggests that 
national regulators could vary their stance to financial institutions that are based in 
non-compliant countries, for example in making decisions relating to market 
access, or enhancing their supervision of such institutions in a number of ways, 
including higher capital requirements.  At the top of the pyramid it suggests that 
the IFIs could consider withholding financial assistance from such countries.  The 
toolbox thus contains a wide range of tools, but the FSB can exercise very few of 
these itself.  Whether in practice there is the political will to adopt these measures 
when they are needed remains to be seen.  
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THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE IMF 
 
The IMF is not a new actor in the financial regulatory regime.  It was a founding 
member of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF).  As noted above, with the World 
Bank it has been monitoring countries’ compliance with certain principles of 
regulation issued by the international committees of regulators as part of its FSAP 
since 2002.  Consistent with the IMF’s mandate, these reports were focused on 
individual country compliance.  They did not consider the systemic implications of 
one country’s regulatory regime.101  The IMF also performed macro-economic 
surveillance.  However, in a reflection of the pre-crisis cognitive and institutional 
divide between macro-economic surveillance and micro-prudential supervision, 
there were no mechanisms in place for their reports to be integrated into the 
processes of banking supervision. 
In the wake of the crisis, the expectations of the role the IMF should play in 
the global financial system have increased, though the exact nature of this role 
remains somewhat unclear.  It is clearly expected to have a far greater role in 
macro-economic surveillance, and has been enhancing its surveillance of financial 
sector activities as part of its Article IV surveillance since 2007.  It has also begun 
to play a more active role in financial regulatory policy, most notably with its 
recent proposals for how banks could contribute to the cost of bailouts,102 and 
there are signs that this role is likely to continue.  In a recent statement, the IMF’s 
Director of Strategy, Policy, and Review, Reza Moghadam, emphasised the IMF’s 
‘near-universal membership, close and regular engagement with country 
authorities, and technical expertise on financial sector issues’ (in implicit but 
unstated contrast to the FSB), meant that is was ‘well positioned to lead on 
financial sector issues’, albeit working closely with others.    
There are also indications that it is moving to play a greater role as an 
enforcer.103  In the same statement, Moghadam suggested, ‘a key aspect of the 
IMF’s ability to be an effective guardian of global macroeconomic and financial 
stability includes overseeing the implementation of rules that govern financial 
regulation,’ in particular through the FSAP process.  The IMF has been making 
significant changes to the FSAP process.  This can be adapted more easily as it is 
at present still a voluntary process which in legal terms is simply a form of 
technical assistance.  It is introducing a strong risk-based element to the 
assessments, moving to having shorter, ‘modular’ assessments on particular issues, 
and greater use of cross-country thematic reviews.  The changes are intended ‘to 
sharpen the focus of assessments; make them more flexible and nimble; 
strengthen the analytical content of stability analysis, comparability, and 
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dissemination of assessments; ensure effective Bank-Fund coordination; and 
improve resource utilization, cost control, and internal processes’.104  The FSAP is 
to be more closely integrated into the bilateral surveillance activities under Article 
IV, where there is also now a greater focus on the financial sector.105  As with the 
FSB, however, there is an ambiguity in the peer review process.  On the one hand 
it is portrayed as best practice sharing and a way to bring peers up to the 
community’s standards; on the other a tool of implementation and enforcement.  
In the shift to risk-based FSAPs, moreover, the question is whether the FSAP will 
be orientated to risk and outcomes, or to compliance and enforcement of 
international standards. 
More fundamentally, it has become apparent that there is a considerable gap 
between the role that is now expected of the IMF, and that which it legally can 
play.  In January 2010 the IMF launched a review of its mandate, arguing that its 
legal powers and purposes are addressed at ‘matters important to a bygone age’.  
In the past the focus was on trade and balance of payments; what is needed now 
are powers to conduct multilateral surveillance, to require action to be taken in the 
interests of the system as a whole, for crisis response, and to ensure stability of 
reserves.106   
The IMF argues in the Review that ‘the central lesson of the crisis has been 
that surveillance for crisis prevention needs to be much more rigorous, with 
greater coverage of financial sector and regulatory issues, and better appreciation 
of systemic risks and spillovers.  Equally, lending for crisis response has to be of a 
speed, coverage and size far beyond previous assumptions’.107  In order to respond 
‘new modalities and outputs may be needed to tackle the systemic implications and 
interactions of country policies, along with a new conception of cooperation, data 
provision and peer review’.108   
It suggests that the Fund could act as a global systemic risk board, taking the 
lead in identifying and prioritising macro-systemic risks through its 
macroeconomic, early warning, and macro-financial analyses, working with 
national authorities, the FSB, and BIS to assess and respond to systemic risks and 
vulnerabilities.109  Amongst other things, it proposes enhancing multilateral 
surveillance and reducing the gap between its bilateral surveillance activities, which  
are based on detailed dialogues with policymakers, and its multilateral surveillance, 
which looks at systemic outcomes, for example by building on the G-20 Mutual 
Assessment Process.110  However, it cautions that given its current organisational 
structures and expertise that the logistical challenges of achieving this should not 
                                                     
104 IMF, Financial Sector and Bilateral Surveillance − Toward Further Integration (IMF, August 2009), 7; see also 
IMF, The FSAP After 10 Years: Experiences and Reform for the Next Decade (IMF, 2009); Revised Approach to 
Financial Regulation and Supervision Standards in FSAP Updates (IMF, 2009). 
105 IMF, Integrating Financial Sector Surveillance Issues and FSAP Assessments into Surveillance (IMF, 2009). 
106 IMF, n 2 above, 3. 
107 ibid, 3. 
108 ibid. 
109 ibid, 6. 
110 ibid. 
                18/2010 
 
 28 
be underestimated.  It also suggests that its bilateral surveillance mandate could be 
strengthened by increasing expectations regarding financial sector policies, for 
example by making FSAPs mandatory for countries with regionally or systemically 
important financial sectors and improving the effectiveness of the bilateral 
surveillance process, although it has also argued that FSAPs should remain 
voluntary.111  With respect to lending, it proposes several ways in which lending to 
countries in times of financial crisis could be provided more flexibly, and perhaps 
without the stigma that IMF financing has for many countries, such as collateral-
based lending and guarantees.112 
However, there are several constraints to achieving these outcomes, both 
legal and organisational.  Its legal and organisational structure limits it to a series of 
bilateral relationships with individual countries; it does not permit it to operate 
multilaterally as a system-wide coordinator or to engage with private sector actors.  
For example, members’ legal obligations regarding domestic policies under the 
Articles are limited to the adoption of policies that promote domestic stability; the 
Fund has no formal legal powers to require them to take action in the interests of 
the financial system as a whole.  It has only limited and episodic access to 
supervisory data (eg in the context of FSAPs), and members often decline to 
provide systemically relevant information on grounds of confidentiality.113  
Further, the Fund has no authority to require confidential data on entities such as 
large complex financial institutions as the Articles expressly provide that members 
are under no obligation to furnish information on individual corporations, 
regardless of their systemic significance.114   
As amendment of the Articles to require such disclosure is unlikely to find 
broad support, it suggests that alternative arrangements will be needed.  These 
could include voluntary agreements with national and regional regulators / 
systemic risk boards, and with the FSB and BIS. It also suggests that a ‘Financial 
Data Dissemination Standard’ could be developed for countries with systemically 
important financial sectors.115   
The expectations, at least of the G-20, of the role that the IMF can and 
should play in financial regulation going forward clearly envisage a significant shift 
in its role.  However, as the IMF points out, it is not so clear that its mandate 
permits this, or at least will require some creative interpretation in order to permit 
it to take on a number of these roles.  Its current mandate review also illustrates 
the uneven role that law plays in the international financial regulatory system and 
its implications for regulatory capacity.  The FSB has been reconstituted without 
need for any such debate, but in contrast does not have hard-edged legal powers 
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that it can deploy.  Colleges of supervisors (discussed below) have been created to 
coordinate supervision; again they have the advantage that they can be rapidly 
constituted, but they rely on each individual member having the legal powers in 
their own jurisdictions to get the information that the supervisors need, and to 
instigate the supervisory response that is deemed to be necessary.  The IMF has 
some considerable legal powers, but in order to fulfil its new role it has to engage 
in a series of creative interpretations that it hopes its members will accept in order 
to avoid the difficult process of amendment to its articles.   
 
 
 
RESTRUCTURING AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL: 
RECONFIGURING EU FINANCIAL REGULATION 
 
The radical restructuring of the institutional structures of EU financial regulation 
is an excellent example of how not to waste a good crisis.  Indeed the Larosiere 
Report, on whose recommendations the restructuring is based, admitted that its 
proposals were more about the enhancement of the European single market than 
they were a response to the financial crisis.  Nevertheless it did argue that 
uncoordinated crisis management action had led to negative spillover effects 
which needed to be addressed.116    
The Larosiere report and subsequent legislation are the manifestation of a 
desire for order, control, and above all, for the elimination of differences.  The 
main problem the Larosiere Report identified in the system of EU financial 
regulation was inconsistent implementation.  In a notable backtracking from the 
tiered approach to rule design advocated by Lamfalussy, in which Level 1 
measures would be formulated as principles, supplemented by detailed rules and 
guidance at Levels 2 and 3, Larosiere argued that the ‘fundamental cause of this 
lack of harmonisation is that the level 1 directives have too often left, as a political 
choice, a range of options to member states as to their implementation.  In these 
circumstances, it is unreasonable to expect the level 3 committees to be able to 
impose a single solution.  Even when a directive does not include national options, 
it can lead to diverse interpretations which cannot be eliminated at level 3 in the 
present legal set-up.’117  Some examples the Larosiere Report identified are crisis-
related, notably the differences in the definition of regulatory capital regarding 
financial institutions.  The treatment of subordinated debt as core tier 1 is the 
object of different adaptations, which as the Report notes, goes at the heart of the 
efficiency and the enforcement of the Basel directive on capital requirements.  
There is also no single agreed methodology to validate risks assessments by 
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financial institutions.118  Other examples are unrelated, for example differences in 
the regulation of insurance mediation and accounting provisions for pensions. 
Nonetheless, the report’s central concerns were coordination and consistency 
in the regulatory structure itself: coordination between macro and micro-
prudential supervision; coordination in crisis management; and above all 
coordination and consistency in the standards that apply throughout the EU.  The 
new structure that is to be established consequent on the report has these issues at 
its centre.   
The legislative reforms will establish a European level body charged with 
overseeing risk in the financial system as a whole, the European Systemic Risk 
Board (ESRB) and create a European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS).119  
The ESRB will monitor and assess potential threats to financial stability that arise 
from macro-economic developments and from developments within the financial 
system as a whole (‘macro-prudential supervision’).  Its role is to provide an early 
warning of system-wide risks that may be building up and, where necessary, issue 
recommendations for action to deal with these risks.  The ESFS, in the words of 
the Commission, 
  
will be built on shared and mutually reinforcing responsibilities, combining 
nationally based supervision of firms with centralisation of specific tasks at 
the European level so as to foster harmonised rules as well as coherent 
supervisory practice and enforcement.  This network should be based on the 
principles of partnership, flexibility and subsidiarity.  It would aim to enhance 
trust between national supervisors by ensuring, inter alia, that host 
supervisors have an appropriate say in setting policies relating to financial 
stability and consumer protection, thereby allowing cross-border risks to be 
addressed more effectively.120  
 
Central to the ESFS is the endowment of a legal basis and set of powers to the 
existing Level 3 committees, converting them into new European Supervisory 
Authorities (ESAs).  A central aim of the creation of the new system is to create a 
single rulebook for the whole of the EU that is consistently interpreted and 
applied throughout the EU by all member state financial regulators.  This process 
is to be strengthened by introducing more directly applicable rules at the EU level 
wherever possible. 
The authors of the new EU regime have extensive ambitions to establish the 
EU authorities as the central regime managers of the network of financial 
supervision within the EU, but are approaching the task in a very different way 
than the FSB or even IMF.  This is partly because they can: the EU has the 
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institutional and legal structures that it can deploy to implement its strategies.  Its 
authors are searching for control, and for the elimination of discretion, variety, 
and difference in financial supervision across member states. 
As with the FSB and IMF, a key tool is to be the peer review process.121  
There has been an uneven development of peer reviews thus far, with CESR 
clearly leading the way.  Thus far, however, the reviews have been largely formal 
assessments of powers and practices, with an orientation to promoting best 
practice.  Peer reviews were introduced by CESR in 2003, and institutionalised 
through the creation of a Review Panel.  Its Review Protocol, issued in March 
2007, emphasises the need to develop coordination and best practices,122 but the 
reviews done to date have been limited to comparative surveys of formal 
supervisory powers and practices, for example with respect to market abuse,123 or 
the practical operation of financial reporting standards and the UCITS passporting 
regime.124  Following CESR’s initiative, CEBS, the Level 3 banking committee, 
adopted substantively the same Protocol as the basis for initiating its own peer 
review process in October 2007.  Thus far it has focused on methods of model 
validation under the Capital Requirements Directive,125 and at the request of the 
Commission, in 2008-2009 its Review Panel has conducted a mapping of 
supervisory powers and objectives across EU banking authorities, with special 
focus on early intervention measures and the actual use of sanctioning powers.126  
It is currently conducting a review of the conduct of supervisory colleges.  
CEIOPs (insurance and occupational pensions) was the last to initiate peer 
reviews, establishing its panel in 2008 and adopting a similar Protocol to the 
others.127  Its initial reviews have thus far consisted of self-assessments by member 
states on provisions of information exchange and supervisory cooperation across 
its remit,128 and a current review of the application of the Common Principles for 
Colleges of Supervisors, shared with CEBS.129  It is clear that the significance of 
the peer review process is intended to increase in the new structure.  The 
proposed Regulations establishing the ESAs emphasise that peer reviews will form 
a central mechanism of coordination, not simply mechanisms of providing 
technical assistance.  The ESAs are legally required to conduct regular peer 
                                                     
121 CESR, ‘General Methodology for Implementation Reviews Undertaken by CESR’, CESR/04-711b 
(April 2005).  
122 CESR 07/070b. 
123 CESR/09-1120 and CESR/07-380; there have also been reviews of powers with respect to MiFID 
(CESR/08-220); ‘Transparency Directive’ (CESR/09-058); and ‘Prospectus Directive’ (CESR/07-383). 
124 See eg CESR/09-1034 (UCITS); CESR/09-374 (Financial Reporting) and associated member state 
self-assessments. 
125 CEBS, Peer Review on CEBS’s Guidelines on the Implementation, Validation and Assessment of Advanced 
Measurement (AMA) and Internal Rating Based (IRB) Approaches (April 2009). 
126 CEBS/09-47. 
127 CEIOPS-DOC-28/08. 
128 For details, see https://www.ceiops.eu/review-panel/index.html. 
129 CEBS, CEIOPS, and IWCFC, Colleges of Supervisors – 10 Common Principles, CEIOPS-SEC-54/08; CEBS 
2008 124 (January 2009). 
                18/2010 
 
 32 
reviews, though national authorities are not formally bound to follow the ESAs’ 
recommendations but are to ‘endeavour’ to do so.130   
 
 
 
MANAGING THE FINANCIAL REGULATORY REGIME: 
ORCHESTRATING INTERACTIONS 
 
The crisis has created a series of ‘cognitive shocks’ for financial regulators, 
prompting a series of policy changes and, of main focus here, of organisational 
restructurings and realignments.  There are clearly a number of challenges going 
forward, but the remainder of the discussion focuses only on three: system 
coordination, reflexive self-observation or ‘learning’, and responsiveness. 
One of the key challenges of polycentric regulation, particularly when it is 
multi-level, is coordination or ‘orchestration’.131  In the financial sphere, the 
question is how best to manage a complex, interlocking network of regulatory 
actors and their relationship with an even more complex, dynamic, and 
interlocking financial system.  Both the FSB at the global level and the EU 
authorities at the regional level are attempting to become ‘regime managers’, and 
in some respects are being positioned in this role by other actors in the regulatory 
arena.  However, this is a far from straightforward trajectory, particularly for the 
FSB which, unlike the EU authorities, cannot rely on a complex institutional 
infrastructure and legal fiat to accomplish this task.  But with respect to both the 
FSB and the new EU regulators, the issue of ‘who governs’ remains contested and 
is underlain with a number of tensions and conflicts.   
There are four main types of institutional structures for control: hierarchy; 
community, markets / competition, and managed networks.132  The FSB is 
attempting to use three of these – hierarchy through the promulgation of rules and 
a system for their enforcement; community in attempting to deploy peer pressure, 
and peer cooperation through support and capacity building; and network 
                                                     
130 Article 15 of the proposed Regulations establishing ESMA, EBS, and EIOPS respectively: European 
Parliament Legislative Resolution of 22 September 2010 on the Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority (COM(2009)0502 – C7-0168/2009 – 2009/0143(COD)); Position of the European Parliament 
Adopted at First Reading on 22 September 2010 with a View to the Adoption of Regulation (EU) No 
.../2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a European Supervisory Authority 
(European Banking Authority), P7_TC1-COD(2009)0142; Position of the European Parliament Adopted 
at First Reading on 22 September 2010 with a View to the Adoption of Regulation (EU) No .../2010 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European 
Securities and Markets Authority), P7_TC1-COD(2009)0144 (September 2010). 
131 K. Abbot and D. Snidal, ‘International Regulation without International Government: Improving 
International Organization Performance through Orchestration’ (June 2010), at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1487129. 
132 Part of the discussion section comes from a paper drafted jointly with Rob Baldwin, ‘Regulatory 
Cohabitation’ (presented at the Regulation conference, Dublin, June 2010); I thank Rob for agreeing to 
the use of part of that paper here. 
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management strategies in that it is attempting to facilitate concerted actions by 
developing or steering processes that either encourage negotiations and 
interactions or foster the conditions for collective behaviour  by building levels of 
consensus to points that allow for action on a given issue, for example as in cross-
border crisis management.  The EU is opting only for one: hierarchy.  Although 
there are indications that the system should in practice be managed on a ‘hub and 
spoke’ basis the ESAs’ powers to settle disputes among national financial 
supervisors, to impose temporary bans on risky financial products and activities, 
and to directly prevent or remedy any breaches of EU law by financial institutions 
should national authorities fail to act, mean that the ‘hub’ has overall powers of 
control to ensure the spokes do not fly off.  The only strategy not being used 
strongly by either is markets: There is little faith at present in the idea that co-
ordination can be achieved ‘through the “ invisible  hand” of the self interest of 
participants’ who are willing to exchange resources and conclude agreements in 
order to attain mutually beneficial solutions and higher levels of collective 
welfare.133  The crisis has shown the limits of that approach as a strategy for 
management of an international regulatory regime. 
A difficulty is that each of these modes of control has quite distinct logics 
that are hard to combine, and often a demanding set of institutional preconditions 
for them to operate successfully which are simply not present.   Hierarchies are 
top-down institutional and control structures in which a central control body lays 
down rules and policies that provide direction to the network of inferior 
institutions. This works best if there is a high degree of organisational integration 
from top to bottom, there is a clear and commonly understood mandate, and the 
control body has the authority, tools, and capacity to organise the network.134  
Hierarchical controls work less well where networks are loosely constituted and 
where the member organisations are numerous, independent, divergent in 
characteristics, and oriented to different objectives.135  Hierarchies also depend on 
recognition by those within them that there is an apex, and that the regulatory 
process is one of implementing goals formulated ex ante by a central authority.  
They struggle in a context in which there are a number of constellations of actors 
operating in the same policy space,136 and moreover where participants see the 
nature of the task not to be one of rule implementation but as an interactive 
process of exchanging information about problems, preferences, responses, and 
                                                     
133 See B.G. Peters, ‘Managing Horizontal Government: the Politics of Co-ordination’ (1998) 76 Pub 
Admin. 295, 298; B. Marin, ‘Generalised Political Exchange’ in B. Marin (ed), Generalised Political Exchange 
(Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1990); R. Fisher and W. Ury, Getting to Yes (Boston Mass., Houghton Mifflin, 
1981); E. Ostrom, Governing the Commons (Cambridge, CUP, 1990). 
134 See eg B.G. Peters, ‘Managing Horizontal Government: the Politics of Co-ordination’ (1998) 76 Pub 
Admin. 295. 
135 D. Chisholm, Co-ordination without Hierarchy (Berkeley, Univ. of California Press, 1989). 
136 See W. Grant, W. Paterson, and C. Whitston, Government and the Chemical Industry (Oxford, OUP, 1988). 
A government motive for creating a network may be the desire to opt out of control over a difficult issue 
– to ‘offload a headache’ – see S. Goldsmith and W. Eggers, Governing by Network.  (Washington DC: 
Brookings, 2004), 43. 
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trade-off goals and resources.137  This is a message that EU policymakers would 
do well to reflect on. 
Community controls are based on recognition of a stable group of peers who 
share a common set of interests, and whose main concern is to remain accepted by 
the community.  Self-interest is either emasculated or is recognised to be 
dependent on or identical to the community interest.  Regulatory strategies based 
on peer pressure and peer support work less well where participants have 
conflicting goals, objectives, and interests and have motivations to compete with 
one another, and where non-participation in the group is not fatal to the survival 
of the outsider.  There are aspects of the international and EU regulatory system 
where these institutional structures are present, but they are by no means 
pervasive. 
Network management strategies are directed towards harnessing the different 
control capacities of the involved actors,138 or developing processes that change 
perceptions and allow collective actions to be taken.  Network management 
strategies are arguably better suited to polycentric regimes in which diffused 
regulators interact and bring different capacities to bear on issues without there 
being any hierarchical linkages but instead there are wider dispersions of authority 
to a number of autonomous bodies who may only be loosely coordinated.  These 
strategies involve creating a governance mechanism for the network which 
establishes agendas rather than common goals; creates communications channels; 
makes ad hoc arrangements to support collective action; brokers solutions by 
bringing problems, solutions, and parties together; promotes favourable 
conditions for joint action; or manages conflicts through mediation and 
arbitration.139  Mediation processes may, indeed, involve the establishing of units 
dedicated to liaising between different actors with the aim of effecting bridges 
between parties with different interests and orientations so as to build 
relationships and inter-organisational trust.140  However, for the network manager, 
the problems of network management are that these strategies are messy, 
complex, fluid, and their outcomes uncertain.  There are strong arguments that it 
is strategies of network management that are needed to regulate complex adaptive 
systems, such as the financial system and the system for its regulation.  Regulatory 
systems have to be adaptable, dynamic, and match variety with variety.  However, 
these are not messages that governments and regulators currently want to hear.   
Despite the differences in their formal organisational structures, both the FSB 
and the EU authorities face a number of similar challenges in trying to position 
themselves as hierarchical ‘leaders’.  First, both are operating in a crowded policy 
                                                     
137 W. Kickert, E-H Klijn, and J. Koppenjan, (eds), Managing Complex Networks (London: Sage, 1997). 
138 See Black, n 9 above; CRI 2006; K. Jayasuriya, ‘The New Regulatory State and Relational Capacity’ 
(2004) 32(4) Policy & Politics 487. 
139 See Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan, n 137 above, 47. 
140 See N. Machado and T. Burns, ‘Complex Social Organization: Multiple Organizing Modes, Structural 
Incongruence and Mechanisms of Integration’ (1998) 76 Public Administration 355, 370. On trust as the 
‘bedrock of collaboration’ see Goldsmith and Eggers, n 136 above, 111. 
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space.  In many respects the FSB is competing with its members as a standard 
setter, and potentially as the guardian of implementation.  Further, its members 
have significantly different regulatory capacities, enhancing the dependence of 
some on the FSB, but reducing that of others.  The OECD, for example, is here a 
‘norm entrepreneur’ – a body that issues principles or standards in the hope that 
others will adopt them and implement them.  The OECD has issued its own 
principles for financial regulation, but they need adopting by the FSB if these 
principles are to be integrated into the peer review process either of the FSB or of 
the IMF / World Bank.   In contrast, the EU has far greater regulatory capacity as 
it has legal powers to act unilaterally, as of course do individual nation states who 
are members of the FSB.   
However, as a standard-setter the EU is also operating in a crowded policy 
arena.  It is competing with international regulators and, to the extent it has left 
them any room to create their own rules, with member states.  Some member 
states are making as much use of this remaining room for policy independence as 
they can, whilst they can.  For example, the drive for national fiscal protectionism 
has led the UK to introduce its own rules on liquidity and remuneration.  As the 
discussion of remuneration principles below illustrates, these rules can then 
percolate through to the international level and then down to the EU level, 
informally inverting the EU’s legal hierarchy.  Moreover, through their own 
membership of the international committees of regulators its member states can 
leapfrog it, exercising influence in the decisions made in other fora which the EU 
then has to decide whether or not to accept (which was one of the reasons 
Larosiere recommended that member states should not have separate 
representation on international committees – a proposal of profound 
constitutional significance).  So although the EU can be a critical and selective 
adopter of transnational standards, as its approach to the IASB’s rules indicates,141 
in crafting its rules it is often working on a canvas on which the main outlines 
have already been drawn by others. 
There are differences between the challenges the FSB and the EU 
Commission face, however, arising from the differences in the organisational 
infrastructure in which they are situated and in their regulatory capacities.  The 
FSB is still in an ambiguous institutional position.  It may evolve to be the overall 
coordinator of the international regulatory regime, but it faces the main problems 
of network management: conflicting objectives and interests of participants; 
difficulties of surveillance over the regime; the use of regulatory tools with 
conflicting logics within the regime; differential capacities and resources of 
participants; lack of its own resources and capacities to effect change or manage 
the network; and the difficulty of getting recognition from participants that they 
                                                     
141 The EU Commissioner, Michel Barnier, has indicated that the EU may not adopt the IFRS rule on fair 
value accounting, and indeed that continued EU funding of the IASB will be contingent on it making 
changes to its governance structure: see eg M. Christodoulou, ‘Europe's IASB Concerns Voiced at Global 
Meeting’ (1 April 2010) Accountancy Age 1.  That debate, as well as the creation of the Monitoring Board, 
illustrates the price the IASB is being required to pay in return for the EU adopting its standards.  
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are in a network that should be managed and that the manager is the FSB.  A 
critical issue will be success in getting members and non-members to implement 
the principles that the FSB issues.  For this, countries and other members of the 
FSB have to afford it sufficient recognition of its legitimacy and authority to 
govern.  It also has to be able to exercise sufficient leverage through peer pressure 
or other means to get compliance from members, and more problematically 
perhaps, from non-members.  Neither of these is a straightforward challenge to 
meet. 
Further, the FSB still faces the fundamental issue that it is national 
governments who, at least under present arrangements, underwrite the financial 
institutions operating in their jurisdiction.  The ‘mortality mismatch’ of financial 
institutions, combined with an understandable policy of fiscal protectionism, 
means that national governments are deeply unwilling to confer sovereignty to 
international bodies or to sign up to common standards or modes of supervision if 
these would compromise their ability to protect their fiscal position in times of 
crisis.  The creation of a global common resolution fund through the IMF may in 
part be an attempt to mitigate this challenge, but its realisation is still some way 
off.   
The EU authorities also face a number of challenges at the regional level.  As 
in the case of the international regulators, a critical issue is not just the creation of 
standards but their implementation.  The EU can use legal fiat to achieve its 
objectives, but it would be a mistake for it to think that the use of legal powers 
removes the need to actively build legitimacy and authority with respect to 
member state regulators.  It would also be a mistake to assume that complete 
harmonisation in the interpretation and implementation of its rules is either 
attainable or desirable, though all the indications are that this is exactly what is 
being attempted.  Although the Authorities now have legal powers to take action 
against infringers, this should be used as a last resort.  The focus should be on 
building recognition and authority independently through their processes and day-
to-day operation.  Here the conflicting rhetoric and powers create a further 
ambiguity, however.  The insistence on complete harmonisation cannot easily be 
reconciled with rhetoric that it should be created ‘fully respecting the 
proportionality and subsidiarity’.142   
Moreover, there are conflicting objectives both at the EU level and between 
the EU and member states.  The structure itself is still ‘siloed’, as at the 
international level, between securities, banking, and insurance, and with an 
institutional divide between macro and micro-prudential regulation, reinforcing at 
the organisational level the cognitive constructions of financial markets which the 
crisis has shown to be flawed.  Ensuring coordination between these different 
actors is clearly essential, but all too often each organisation can remain bounded 
by its own job description and institutional focus.   
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Furthermore, the new EU Authorities have a set of legal powers but very 
little operational or regulatory capacity to effect change or manage the network of 
member state regulators, although the rapid increase in their staffing levels may 
enhance this.  Nonetheless, they are likely to continue to rely heavily on a small 
number of member states for expertise.  This ‘asymmetric Europeanisation’ is a 
familiar feature of the operation of other EU regulatory agencies, and there is little 
reason to think the regime for financial regulation will be any different.143  Further, 
although again the legal structures create a clear legal hierarchy for managing the 
regime, this does not on its own resolve the problem of how to gain recognition 
from participants that they should be managed and that the managers are the 
Authorities. 
Moreover, the policy dynamics created by banks’ mortality mismatch exert a 
significant centripetal force at the EU level, just as they do at the international 
level.  The Larosiere Report’s insistence on harmonisation was shot through with 
exceptions to allow member states to act in the interests of national financial 
stability, and these have been embedded into the new regulatory structures and 
processes.  The passporting regime for banks, the central plank of European 
financial integration, has been put into question, and as noted above has been 
strongly criticised in some quarters as providing the channels through which 
financial instability can spread.144  The focus is less on the ability of banks to do 
cross-border business, and far more on the protection of national deposit holders 
and the national fiscal position.    
Finally, the EU regime itself sits in an interesting position within the global 
regime.  To the extent that the EU is attempting to create a single system of 
financial regulation it creates a potentially ambiguous position for itself in the 
international regulatory sphere, one which raises interesting questions.  If the EU 
institutions are not just coordinators but are themselves the key regulators in the 
EU system, should they not be subject to monitoring by the FSB, or by the IMF 
(albeit under a revised IMF mandate)?  Arguably they should, if they are really to 
be setting the single rulebook and single set of supervisory strategies.  This may 
not be a process the EU institutions would be entirely comfortable with, however.  
This would create an interesting dynamic between EU institutions and their 
member states, who may welcome an FSB / IMF assessment of the ESAs, 
particularly if they think there are deficiencies in the EU regime, and may use their 
individual membership in these bodies to push for one. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
143 L. Barroso, The European Regulatory State (PhD thesis, London School of Economics, in progress). 
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MULTI-LATERAL SUPERVISORY ARRANGEMENTS 
 
In addition to the restructurings outlined above, there has been a move to 
strengthen multi-lateral regulatory arrangements for the regulation of firms 
themselves.  In the past, the main focus of the international regulatory efforts has 
been member states: this has been a ‘regulator to regulator’ conversation, not 
regulator to private market actor.  It has moreover been a ‘governmental regulator 
to governmental regulator’ conversation.  The membership of the global and EU 
regulatory organisations reflects this divide.  The IASB is the only non-state 
regulatory body that is a member of the FSB.  ISDA, the only central actor in the 
derivatives markets, that organised the successful auction in March 2010, is not a 
member of any of the international committees of regulators.   
One of the weaknesses of ‘regulator to regulator’ conversations is that they 
can be too removed from what is happening in the markets.  A key difficulty for 
regulators, as for governments, is having information of sufficient granularity.  
They are in a better position than individual market actors to have aggregate, 
system-wide information; but the latter have the detailed, ‘on the ground’ 
information.145  A further difficulty for polycentric regulatory regimes is ensuring 
adequate information flows between different parts of the regime.  The crisis 
demonstrated that the ‘regulator to regulator’ nature of the structures, combined 
with the ‘silo-ing’ of regulation into insurance, securities, and banking creates 
significant impediments to information flows between regulators at the EU and 
global levels.   
It has been suggested in other contexts that building resilient systems of 
information and surveillance, particularly in conditions of uncertainty and which 
are subject to rapid change, and where knowledge is gained through the process of 
implementing regulation, requires multi-scale networks, in which different types of 
information is gathered, aggregated, and tested at different points within a 
network.146  The global, including EU, financial regulatory regime has a number of 
points at which information is currently collected about firms.  In addition, 
national regulators have generally good arrangements in place for exchanging 
information with respect to individual firms in the context of enforcement 
processes.  IOSCO in particular has required all members to agree to multilateral 
MOU on information sharing.147 
However, as yet there is only a weak linking between these points and other 
parts of the regime at both global and regional (EU) level, and indeed between the 
two levels.  Two notable examples are the weak linkages between colleges of 
                                                     
145 Scott, n 28 above.  
146 P. Sheridan, D. Watts, and C. Sabel, ‘Information Exchange and the Robustness of Organizational 
Networks’ (2003) 100(21) PNAS 12516. 
147 IOSCO, ‘Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and 
the Exchange of Information’ (IOSCO, 2002); the requirement was for members to sign by 1 January 
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supervisors at all levels, between colleges and the peer review process, and 
between both of those and the standard-setting processes of the international 
committees and potentially the different European authorities. 
 
COLLEGES OF SUPERVISORS 
 
Colleges of supervisors are at present the only place where ‘regulator to firm’ 
conversations occur outside the national setting.  The notion of colleges of 
supervisors for banks pre-dates the crisis, but their crisis gave significant impetus 
to their development, and they have now been mandated by the G-20 
governments for global financial institutions.148  In the EU they have received 
legal foundation via amendments to the Capital Requirements Directive.149  
International colleges of supervisors (ICSs) are permanent, although flexible, 
structures for cooperation and coordination among the authorities responsible for 
and involved in the supervision of the different components of global cross-
border banking groups.  They have also been more recently developed for 
insurance companies.  They provide a forum intended to facilitate sharing of 
information, views, and assessments among supervisors in order to allow for a 
more efficient and effective consolidated and solo supervision and timely action; 
enable supervisors to develop a common understanding of the risk profile of the 
group as the starting point for risk-based supervision at both group and solo 
levels; coordinate supervisory review and risk assessment, establishing supervisory 
plans, arranging any division of tasks and joint onsite visits, thus avoiding 
duplication of work and reducing the regulatory burden; and coordinate decisions 
taken by individual authorities.150  They can also help to develop a consistent 
interpretation and application of regulatory provisions across the group and build 
trust between supervisors.151   
Colleges of supervisors are also intended to work alongside firm-specific 
cross-border crisis management groups under the FSB’s Principles for Cross-border 
Cooperation on Crisis Management.  National authorities from the relevant countries 
are to meet regularly alongside core colleges to consider the specific issues and 
barriers to coordinated action that may arise in handling severe stress at specific 
firms, to share information where necessary and possible, and to ensure that firms 
develop adequate contingency plans.152  There are nonetheless significant issues to 
be negotiated in securing cross-border cooperation.  These arise from differing 
national institutional structures for financial regulation and insolvency and in some 
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149 Adopted May 2009, CRD Article 131(a). 
150 CEBS (December 2007). 
151 House of Lords, ‘Evidence of the European Banking Federation to House of Lords: The Future of 
EU Financial Regulation and Supervision’ (June 2009). 
152 FSB’s Principles for Cross-border Cooperation on Crisis Management (2009), Preface.  The FSB’s recent 
implementation report, in April 2010, stated that firm-specific cross-border crisis management groups 
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cases national laws inhibiting cross-border solutions, differences on policy issues, 
lack of crisis management tools and experience in managing crisis, concerns that 
cross-border cooperation can reduce national discretion, and key issues in relation 
to burden-sharing.153   
Focusing here on the day-to-day process of supervision, there has been a 
rapid evolution in the colleges’ operation, and on the whole they have been 
positively received by the banks and others.154  However as the FSB has reported 
there are still several issues to be resolved in the way the colleges operate.  These 
included the issue of membership, the balance between inclusiveness and 
effectiveness, communication between a core group of supervisors and the wider 
group, and the need for supervisors to start changing their approaches and 
undertaking more joint supervisions in the light of the new information and risk 
profiling of the financial institution in question.155   
Further, because the EU has established its own EU supervisory colleges for 
European global banks, a bank can have two colleges, the international and the 
European, raising further issues of coordination between the colleges.  There is at 
present no systematised process or structure in which the two colleges can confer 
or exchange information with respect to the same financial institution, or indeed 
merge to operate as a single college when supervising a cross-border bank.156  At 
the European level, there are also issues of coordination between the supervisory 
colleges and the new European authorities, both of whom are concerned with 
developing common practices of supervision and implementation between their 
members.157   
Not only that, but there are issues as to who should be setting the principles 
by which the colleges operate.  Although firms may be multi-functional, regulation 
at the global and EU levels remains siloed into securities, banking, and insurance.  
Thus far the securities regulators have not had a significant role to play in the 
colleges.  In the EU, only the banking and insurance supervisors have coordinated 
in developing principles.158  There is even less coordination apparent at the global 
level.159  There is the additional question of who should be the prime author of 
principles for supervisory colleges, and whether the principles should be nested in 
                                                     
153 See ibid; see eg C. Goodhart and D. Schoenmaker, ‘Burden sharing in a Banking Crisis in Europe’ 
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a (non-legal, but normatively accepted) hierarchy of norms.  So although the EU 
committees have formulated their own principles, they are not the only actors in 
the regulatory space; the international committees clearly have a role in setting 
principles for the ICSs.  The international regulators for banking and insurance are 
developing their own principles but the FSB has not led this process, though there 
has been suggestion that the FSB has issued guidance but has not made it 
public.160  However some, notably the European Banking Federation, have argued 
that it should be the FSB who takes the lead in setting principles for the colleges’ 
operation, though drawing on EU principles.161  It is far from clear how these 
issues are going to be resolved at either the EU or the global level.   
 
POTENTIAL STRATEGIES FOR DEVELOPING CAPACITIES, RESPONSIVENESS, AND 
LEARNING – CREATING MULTI-LEVEL POINTS OF COORDINATION AND 
INFORMATION EXCHANGE 
 
The regime for financial regulation at both global and EU levels thus faces a 
significant set of challenges with respect to how it manages itself, let alone how it 
attempts to regulate market actors.  Orchestrating the terms of cohabitation 
between participants is difficult where there is no completely agreed score for each 
to play, little agreement over who should be the conductor, only weak consensus 
as to whether all need to follow him, and only muted ability of each to hear what 
those in other sections of the orchestra are playing.  Faced with such challenges, 
issues of how to ensure the system is able to anticipate future crises or challenge 
conventional wisdoms can appear mere fripperies: nice to have, but there is more 
important business to be getting on with. 
This reaction is understandable, but short-sighted.  Both the regulation and 
the markets have suffered significant cognitive shocks: the assumptions on which 
they based regulation and the technologies they used to manage risks turned out to 
be based on fundamentally flawed cognitive models of markets, behaviour, and 
risk.  Regulators and others are struggling to create a new cognitive framework in 
which to develop policy responses.    
Part of that process requires gaining knowledge.  Gaining knowledge requires 
acquiring information and making sense of it through a cognitive framework.  
However, there is a ‘chicken and egg’ dynamic at work here: the cognitive 
framework shapes the search for information as well as its interpretation.  Like the 
drunkard who only searches for his lost wallet under a street lamp because that is 
where the light is, regulators can focus only on information that is easily visible, 
systematisable, and quantifiable, and not look elsewhere.162  However, the dangers 
of using only limited sources of information in managing risks are well noted in 
                                                     
160 EBF, International Colleges of Supervisors and Global European Banks (EBF Ref.: D1239E-2009, September 
2009). 
161 ibid. 
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the risk management literature,163 and were manifested in the crisis.  In Rumsfeld’s 
well-worn trichotomy, there are the known knowns, the known unknowns, and 
the unknown unknowns.  In risk management, different strategies are appropriate 
for each state of knowledge.164  Regulators can never know all, and therefore never 
can anticipate everything: that is the nature of risk management.  But they can at 
least improve on their ability to limit the extent of the unknown unknowns and 
respond accordingly.   
Work therefore needs to focus on two interlinked fronts.  Firstly, regulators 
need to gain information from a wider range of sources than at present and 
coordinate its collection and analysis, in order to help them overcome problems of 
scale – how those developing strategies at a systemic level can have sufficient 
granular knowledge of how different parts of the system are working ‘on the 
ground’.  Secondly, they need to develop mechanisms for cognitive challenge.   
Focusing first on information and problems of scale, work done to date on 
network management systems suggests that a fruitful coordination strategy for 
managing complex systems is to develop intermediators, links in the system 
between its component parts.165  Creating points for the collection and 
dissemination of information about the performance of the different parts of the 
regime is a good place to start.  To give two examples, there are two existing 
mechanisms that are currently not utilised in this way but that offer some 
potential: colleges of supervisors and the peer review process.   
Colleges of supervisors have their own challenges, as discussed above, but 
they are in an extremely good position to gain a global view of a financial 
institution.  That view is of course not perfect, as the information asymmetries 
that exist between regulator and regulated will always remain.  But it is a better 
vantage point than any national regulator has, or any regional or international 
committee of regulators.  However, at present there are four and potentially up to 
six different colleges operating (two or three at the international level for banking, 
securities, and insurance; two to three at the EU level, again for banking, 
securities, and insurance), and on a number of occasions with respect to the same 
financial institution.  There is as yet little or no coordination between them at 
either level or between the EU and international level.  Moreover, there is no clear 
way in which the reports or observations of the colleges are reviewed or otherwise 
incorporated into the activities of the international committees of standard-setters.   
In failing to provide adequate coordination the regulatory regime as a whole is 
missing a significant opportunity to gain valuable information as to what is 
happening within financial institutions themselves, and thus to address, at least in 
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part, the problem of scale.  There is an existing forum where that information 
could be exchanged: the Joint Forum.  The Joint Forum, it is suggested, could be 
leading both on setting principles for the conduct of colleges, but also and perhaps 
more critically, on gathering information from them with respect to cross-border 
financial institutions and providing a point for aggregating and testing that 
information and then disseminating it around the rest of the regime, and further 
integrating it into the standard-setting process.   
Moreover, there is a case for linking the colleges with the peer review process, 
and indeed, more radically, for using ‘360 degree’ review in the peer review 
process.  At present a peer review, either via an FSAP or via the ‘Level 3’ 
committee processes, consists of a self assessment and / or a review of national 
regulators by regulatory officials from other countries, supported by a secretariat 
from the World Bank / IMF or relevant committee.  This process is an important 
facet of the regime, as noted above.  The peer review process, however, is also 
overlooking potentially valuable sources of information.  National regulators can 
gain a good insight into the performance of each other within the colleges of 
supervisors.  Indeed early reports on their operation indicated that much of the 
time was spent in regulators giving technical assistance to other regulators.166  It is 
always a sensitive matter to ask one country what it thinks of another’s 
performance, but not impossible.  Integrating an assessment of a regulator’s fellow 
members in a supervisory college into the peer review process could provide a 
greater insight into the quality of a regulator than an assessment against the formal 
indicators which are predominantly used at present.  Going further and asking 
financial institutions themselves for an assessment of their supervisors’ 
performance is probably a step too far for many national regulators, but it would 
bring the peer review assessment process closer in line with common management 
practices within both public and private sector organisations.   
The second task that regulators need to focus on is to create mechanisms for 
cognitive challenge.  Risks are things that may happen in the future.  As we have 
seen, scenario analysis is a key aspect of risk management for financial institutions 
and is a necessary and inevitable part of regulating risk.  Managing risks requires 
managers to imagine how they may arise and what their consequences may be.  
But the scenarios that they imagine can be too bounded and conservative.  In 
short, regulators need to be more imaginative.  They need to use an enhanced 
knowledge of the past and the present to build more imagined, and imaginative, 
futures.  Furthermore, rather than searching for harmonisation, the regulatory 
regime needs to build in structures for challenge and experimentation.167  
Regulatory reviews need to focus not just on impact assessments and sunshine 
reviews, but on what risks and activities it may be ignoring.  This includes 
developing the equivalent of the ‘near miss’ analysis so important to risk 
management in a number of domains, including air traffic control, nuclear power, 
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and medicine.168  But it also requires a cognitive openness to different 
understandings of markets, risk, and behaviour, that requires gaining information 
and understandings from multiple sources.  The claim is often brought that 
regulators need to be experts, to know how the markets operate.  To this end, the 
Bank of England used to have ‘grey panthers’, senior bankers who advised 
officials on the markets.  There is no doubt a place for grey panthers, but there is 
arguably a greater need for mavericks, of any hue.  Greater diversity in the 
membership of key decision making bodies and in the people that they talk to 
could help to promote a different way of thinking.  There needs to be someone to 
say when the Emperor has no clothes. 
 
 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Regulation is a messy, complex, and often thankless task.  In theoretical terms, the 
regime for financial regulation provides a clear illustration of a complex 
polycentric regime operating in a complex and dynamic environment where 
interactions and interdependencies are ill understood, in which power is 
fragmented and contested and regulatory capacities are highly variable.  The 
putative ‘regime managers’ are attempting to steer the regime or different parts of 
it, but their role remains contested as existing actors seek to maintain their own 
policy autonomy.  Further, all regulators are in a complex institutional position, in 
that the crisis has demonstrated to them and the markets that both sets of actors 
were operating on fundamentally flawed assumptions.  The cognitive shocks 
caused by the crisis have prompted a series of critical self-observations.  Whilst 
this learning process is essential, it poses two problems.  The first is that regulators 
are learning from a limited range of experiences.  The crisis was an experience of 
major significance, but it took regulators into largely unchartered waters.  There 
had been banking crises before, but none that affected so much of the global 
financial system at one time and on such a scale.  There are well-recognised 
difficulties for organisations who attempt to learn from limited experiences: the 
lessons drawn may relate well to this crisis but may not be relevant for the next 
crisis that will take a different form.169  Secondly, regulators have to engage in 
processes of critical self-reflection if they are to learn, but in so doing they risk 
jeopardising their claim to expert authority.  Leaders and experts are expected to 
know the answers.  To be constantly questioning what one is doing can look to 
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outsiders as if one is trapped in self-doubt.170  This paradoxical position is difficult 
for an organisation to avoid when it operates in the public gaze and where 
transparency of its operations and discussions is demanded by its various 
legitimacy communities, including other regulators within the regime.171 
There is no simple answer to the multiple challenges that financial regulators 
face.  The easy solution is to advocate organisational reform.  This may have the 
advantage of making policymakers and regulators look busy, but it can often avoid 
problems rather than confront them.  There is also a limit to what organisational 
structures can achieve.  Coordination is a difficult challenge, but the solution 
advocated here is not the creation of a single ‘world financial regulator’, although 
this has been proposed by some.172  It could be argued that this is the natural 
solution: that what is also needed is clearer leadership from the top, so that all 
regulators in the world are operating to a single set of rules and using a single set 
of supervisory processes.  Such a development at the global level is politically hard 
to envisage at present, but it is exactly this which is being attempted at the EU 
level.  At either level, it is not clear it is desirable.  There are still significant 
problems of scale to overcome; a global and EU financial regulator would still 
have to rely on national regulatory authorities to implement regulation; many rules 
would still have to be at the level of general principles to be able to accommodate 
local conditions and cultures; the political difficulties of gaining agreement on 
rules and sanctioning recalcitrant national governments or their regulators would 
still remain; there would still be significant differences in regulatory capacities 
between different regulators and different countries; and it is by no means clear 
that such a system would be any more or less transparent, representative, or 
‘democratic’ than the present one.  It would be neater to depict on an 
organisational chart, but that should not be its principal virtue.   
As for rules and practices, harmonisation is certainly tidy, and cross-border 
firms like it, or at least say they do – in fact they can benefit from differences 
between regimes by regulatory arbitrage.  However the dangers of harmonisation, 
as evidenced in part by the crisis, are that it creates endogenous risk.  Just as 
uniformity of risk models meant all market actors responded in the same way, 
magnifying the risks they were meant to be mitigating, standardisation of 
regulatory requirements meant to mitigate risks, if flawed, can cause risks to spread 
far more quickly than a variety of standards.173 
Rather the solution proposed is modest and partial – less likely to grab the 
headlines but probably more likely to make a difference.  It is to recognise that 
regulators need different types of information, they need to be open to challenge 
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and they need to be imaginative.  That requires two, possibly contradictory, 
strategies: building in more resilience and creating linkages between the 
component parts to enable information to flow through, but also creating scope 
for greater imagination, experimentation, and challenge: a place for mavericks as 
well as panthers.  Without these, regulators will indeed be trapped fighting the last 
war. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
